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AN EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS OF
DEFENSIVE TACTICS
RONALD J. GILSON* ALAN SCHWARTZ**
For thirty-five years, courts and scholars have been divided over the effects of
defensive tactics in the market for corporate control. Strong defensive tactics
locate authority to accept a hostile bid in the target’s board. The board can
bargain for a higher takeover price than uncoordinated shareholders could real-
ize, but high takeover prices may reduce shareholder returns by reducing the
likelihood of receiving a bid. The Delaware Courts themselves disagree. The
Delaware Chancery Court would locate ultimate decision authority in the tar-
get’s shareholders, while the Supreme Court, by permitting strong defensive tac-
tics, allocates extensive power to the target’s board. Though the Supreme Court’s
view settles the legal issue in Delaware for now, the normative debate among
scholars and decision makers regarding whether the shareholders or the board
should decide remains unresolved.
The Delaware courts ask whether defensive tactics maximize target shareholder
welfare: the shareholders’ expected return from acquisitions. But the more im-
portant question concerns social welfare: do defensive tactics reduce efficiency
in the market for corporate control? Empirical difficulties so far have prevented
analysts from answering either the private or social welfare question rigorously.
Regarding private welfare, the analyst cannot observe bids that a target’s defen-
sive tactics level deterred. Regarding public welfare, the analyst cannot observe
how an otherwise identical market would behave under either weak or strong
defensive tactics levels.
We address the two empirical questions by creating a structural model that
predicts how the market for corporate control performs under varying defensive
tactics levels and then testing the model by simulating market performance. A
simulation permits us to isolate the effect of different defensive tactics levels. It
also permits us to solve for a target’s optimal tradeoff between the increased
share of an acquisition’s gain that strong defensive tactics permits a target to
capture and the reduced probability of receiving bids in consequence of the ac-
quirer’s reduced gain.
The simulated corporate control market performs poorly, making 15% fewer
acquisitions under strong defensive tactics than under weak defensive tactics.
Target boards, however, apparently have been faithful fiduciaries for their
shareholders, choosing defensive tactics levels that optimize the tradeoff be-
tween bid frequency and bid returns. On the one hand, we show that the pri-
vately optimal target defensive tactics level greatly exceeds the socially efficient
level. On the other, we suggest that some firms’ recent efforts further to
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\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 2 12-MAR-21 14:04
2 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 11
strengthen defensive tactics, such as by combining a staggered board with a
poison pill, reduce both efficiency and target shareholder welfare.
Our results do not support a call for an immediate regulatory response. Initially,
we do not rigorously analyze other possible justifications for defensive tactics,
such as that they encourage potential targets to take long-term projects that the
market may undervalue. Also, simulations raise an external validity question: do
the researcher’s assumed simulation parameters capture real world patterns?
We argue that our parameters do well on this measure, but a simulated market
cannot perfectly capture real world behavior. As well, the magnitude of our
results and their consistency with theoretical predictions strongly support our
central claim: today’s market for corporate control is so unlikely to maximize
the number of value-increasing acquisitions that scholars, regulators, and courts
should revisit the defensive tactics debate.
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INTRODUCTION
A. The Market for Corporate Control
The “market for corporate control” is the market in which companies
or investment vehicles such as private equity firms search for other compa-
nies to buy. The companies that search are called “acquirers”; the compa-
nies that are searched for are called “targets.” A private target usually is
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controlled by a small number of shareholders; a public target is owned by a
much larger number of shareholders. We study the subset of the market for
corporate control in which public or private acquirers search for public
targets to buy.
Before 1985, an acquirer would approach a potential target’s board with
an offer to acquire the target. If the board said yes, the two parties would
negotiate the terms of an acquisition. The target’s shareholders would then
accept or reject the deal. Acceptance, as is the case today, could take the
form of a vote in favor of the acquisition (if the acquisition was structured as
a merger or purchase of the target’s assets) or take the form of a direct sale of
shares from the shareholders to the acquirer. If the target board rejected the
acquirer’s offer, however, the acquirer could make an offer directly to the
target shareholders—a hostile offer—to buy their stock: a tender offer. If a
substantial majority of the shareholders accepted the offer, the acquirer
would then control the target. The acquirer would elect its own board that
either would merge the target into itself or operate the target as an indepen-
dent entity. A successful direct offer to buy target shares was, and still is,
called a “hostile takeover.”
In the mid-1980s, the Delaware Chancery Court, which in Delaware is
the trial-level court for corporate legal questions, evaluated the legal status
of defensive tactics.1 These tactics transfer much of the power over a hostile
offer from the target shareholders to the target’s board of directors. For ex-
ample, the “poison pill,” one of the most effective defensive tactics, entirely
precludes a hostile bid by making it impossible for a potential acquirer to
realize value from buying target shares.2 When a target is “pill protected,” a
potential acquirer’s choices are either to make an offer high enough to induce
the target’s board to agree or to undertake the lengthy, expensive, and uncer-
tain task of running a proxy contest to oust the board and elect new directors
that would be more inclined to sell. At the extreme, a hostile bid for a target
with a staggered board would require the potential acquirer to win two suc-
cessive proxy contests.3
Reviewing defensive tactics, Delaware Chancery held that a target’s
board could use the poison pill and other defensive tactics to buy the board
time to evaluate a bid and to interest other bidders. But the board’s power
1 Chancellor Chandler provides a detailed account of the history of Delaware law in his
opinion in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 94–101 (Del. Ch.
2011).
2 See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Michael D. Wittry, Institutional and Legal Context in Natu-
ral Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws, 73 J. FIN. 657, 696 (2018) (“[W]e
agree that classified boards and poison pills combine to offer a strong takeover defense. But
this insight does not imply that no other defenses matter. . . . [E]ven for firms with classified
boards, other types of defenses can increase a firm’s takeover protection.”).
3
A company has a staggered board when only a fraction of its directors are elected annu-
ally rather than all of its directors elected annually. A Delaware Chancellor once remarked that
no acquirer had succeeded in winning two proxy contests in a row. See Air Products, 16 A.3d
at 113.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 4 12-MAR-21 14:04
4 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 11
was time limited: ultimately, the board had to let the shareholders accept or
reject the bid of a persistent potential acquirer.4 The Chancery Court’s posi-
tion on defensive tactics created what we call a “defensive tactics un-
friendly” legal regime. But in a series of later decisions, the Delaware
Supreme Court overruled the Chancery Court, holding that as long as the
target’s board was acting as a faithful fiduciary for the shareholders, the
board could prevent the shareholders from considering a bid.5 The Delaware
Supreme Court thus created what we call a “defensive tactics friendly” legal
regime. Hostile takeovers are very much more difficult in this regime.
B. Rationales for Defensive Tactic
There are four rationales for a regime that is friendly to defensive tac-
tics. It is helpful, in explicating these, to set out two relevant definitions of
efficiency. “Exchange efficiency” holds that assets should move to an agent
who values the assets more highly than the current owner does.6 Exchange
efficiency is realized (on an expected basis) when a private company owner
accepts a bid. The acquirer must believe that the target is worth more to it
than the bid price, and the owner must believe that the bid is worth more to
her than the value she would derive from continuing to own the target.
The market for corporate control is similar but not identical. To see the
difference, suppose that the present discounted value of a potential target’s
net income is $1,000, and there are 100 target shares outstanding. If the
market prices the target accurately, each share should sell for $10. Let an
acquirer bid $12 a share for all of the shares. The acquirer of a public com-
pany must believe, as the acquirer of the private company believed, that the
target is worth more than $12 per share in its hands. If the target sharehold-
ers accept the bid, the acquisition then is ex ante exchange efficient in the
standard way: the acquirer prefers owning the assets, and the sellers—the
shareholders—are happy to receive a premium above the target’s current
value.
The first rationale for defensive tactics holds that board control permits
a target to prevent inefficient acquisitions. In particular, this rationale rejects
the assumption that the corporate control market prices companies accu-
4 See City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
5 See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389–90 (Del. 1995);
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner), 571 A.2d 1140, 1154–55 (Del.
1990).
6 The early academic debates largely focused on exchange efficiency. Compare Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1, 21 (1982) (arguing that all defensive tactics should be prohibited based on a social welfare
measure), and Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 54 (1982) (arguing that the returns to acquirer search for
good targets depends on whether the best searchers are also the best parties to realize acquisi-
tion gains), with Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Hostile Tender Offers: A Reply
and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24 (1982) (arguing that competing bids are beneficial to
both target shareholders and social welfare).
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rately. To see what follows from this rejection, make two heuristic assump-
tions: (a) the market price of our illustrative target is an inaccurately low $7
a share, and (b) the target’s board has private information that the target
actually is worth $10 a share but cannot credibly communicate this informa-
tion to the market. On these assumptions, target shareholders might accept a
bid of $8.50 a share—a 21.4% premium. The acquisition would be exchange
inefficient, however, if the target would be worth only $9.50 a share in the
acquirer’s hands. The target’s board, this rationale holds, should have the
power to block bids until the market comes to see that the target’s true value
is $10 a share.7
The second rationale for defensive tactics is distributional: it holds that
a board’s power to block a hostile bid yields higher prices for targets than a
target’s shareholders could realize on their own.8 The shareholders, being
dispersed and unorganized, would accept any bid that is nontrivially above
the pre-bid price.9 By contrast, a board with blocking power has the ability
to negotiate as would a single owner of the target’s assets. While in the
example above target shareholders may accept a 20% or 21% premium, the
second rationale holds that a board with control might negotiate a 30%
premium.10
Two features of this distributional rationale should be noted. Initially,
the rationale facilitates inefficient outcomes. If it would be exchange effi-
cient for our illustrative target to change hands at $12 a share, the transaction
7 According to Delaware courts, a takeover bid “substantively coerces” target sharehold-
ers when it offers them the opportunity to accept a bid that may be below the “true” value of
the company but the shareholders will not recognize that their company is underpriced. Ed-
ward G. Fox, Merrit B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law
and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 325, 398–406 (2016); Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 260 (1988). Fox et al. evalu-
ates empirically when, if ever, substantive coercion might exist. Fox et al. supra note 7, at 333.
A board that believes that every bid will likely be below a target’s true value can effectively
opt out of the market for corporate control by adopting very strong defenses. Id. at 398–99. In
our simulations, such a firm would be a “noise firm” whom acquirers searching for targets
could not buy.
8 See Martin Lipton, Takeovers in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 106–09
(1979) (presenting board discretion argument); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Mana-
gerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 77 (1988) (formalizing an informationally inefficient but
otherwise rational justification for takeover defenses).
9 The intermediation of equity through institutional investors calls the standard negotiation
argument into question. We note but do not address here the tension between the dispersed
shareholder argument and increased equity concentration in institutional investors as record
holders. For further discussion on this topic, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Law Working Paper No. 239, 2014).
10 For suggestive data that defensive tactics permit targets to realize a substantial fraction
of an acquisition’s expected return, see Theodosios Dimopoulos & Stefano Sacchetto, Preemp-
tive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 444, 445 (2014)
(noting target resistance explains the premium in 74% of single-bidder contests).
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costs of the acquirer-board negotiations that yield a $13 price are a dead-
weight social loss. Turning to the second feature, a target board that has the
power to block bids has an economic problem to solve. Strong defensive
tactics give a board the power to increase the price the target can command
conditional on receiving a bid. But strong defensive tactics, we will see,
reduce the probability that the target will receive bids because acquirers are
less willing to purchase when the target board’s negotiating power reduces
the portion of the expected acquisition gain acquirers can keep. Thus, a tar-
get board acts in its shareholders’ best interest only if it chooses the defen-
sive tactics level that optimally trades off bid size against bid frequency. A
target board that rejects bids to protect its independent position, on the other
hand, is unfaithful.
The issue for a state court, however, is not whether a target’s board is
maximizing social welfare—that is, exchange efficiency—but whether the
board is a faithful fiduciary. On this understanding, the second distributional
rationale is the more important of the two. As we will see, it motivates the
Delaware Supreme Court to give target boards great leeway to choose pri-
vately efficient defensive tactics levels.
The third rationale for defensive tactics posits that board control facili-
tates “investment efficiency.” This efficiency concept holds that an owner
should invest in her assets until the marginal expected value increase equals
the marginal investment cost. To understand the relevance of investment ef-
ficiency, suppose that the corporate control market accurately values targets
as they are currently run, but the market tends to undervalue long-term
growth prospects. Then suppose a company has a choice of two projects:
project A with an expected value of vA that pays off in two years, and project
B with an expected value of vB that pays off in five years. Project B (dis-
counted to present value), however, has a higher value than A. Now let the
market value project A correctly but possibly undervalue project B: the B
market price per share could be below true project value. As in the example
above, if the target pursued project B, its shareholders could accept a bid that
is lower than the value the target ultimately will come to have. Such a bid
would permit the acquirer to realize the full value vB when project B matures
for a fraction of the investment cost and would leave the target with un-
reimbursed investment expenses.
The investment efficiency concern, however, manifests ex ante. Condi-
tional on the target taking the higher valued project B, society is as well off
if much of the gain goes to the acquiring company as society would be if all
of the gain went to the target company. But in a world without defensive
tactics the target would respond to the prospect of losing investment gains
by pursuing the lower valued project A. The investment efficiency rationale
for defensive tactics thus holds that board control would permit the target to
take the higher valued project B because a board would block bids until the
market recognized the value project B would create.
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The fourth rationale for defensive tactics concerns the welfare of stake-
holders. These are individuals or entities who are neither target nor acquirer
shareholders but who are affected by acquisitions. Such stakeholders include
customers, suppliers, and employees of a potential target and may include
members of a local community such as merchants and property owners. An
acquisition may be value maximizing for shareholders of the acquiring and
target companies but value reducing for some stakeholders. For example, a
successful acquirer may move target assets to another location, thereby dis-
advantaging local merchants and those employees who are reluctant to relo-
cate. Defensive tactics give a target board the power to weigh the gains to
shareholders from an acquisition against the costs to stakeholders. If the
costs are too high, the board could use the power that defensive tactics pro-
vide to reject a bid that would be value maximizing only for target and ac-
quirer shareholders.11
Each of the four rationales raises questions. Regarding the exchange
and investment efficiency rationales, academic commentators reject the view
that capital market pricing is so inaccurate that it permits many value mini-
mizing takeovers, and also believe that there are few projects with expected
virtues a company could not credibly communicate to the market. The sec-
ond rationale, that protected boards can get higher prices, is correct but so-
cially questionable. Finally, there is a general view that corporate boards
should manage for stakeholders as well as for shareholders, but there is no
consensus about how boards should do this.12 Nevertheless, the four ratio-
nales are motivating for decision makers and so should be subject to serious
scrutiny.
C. What this Article Does
We focus on the first two rationales for defensive tactics: whether de-
fensive tactics are exchange efficient and whether target boards choose pri-
vately optimal or excessively high defensive tactics levels. To pursue these
questions, we suppose that capital market prices are roughly accurate and
11 We note that decisions regarding how to divide gains among stakeholders other than as
dictated by the factor markets in which stakeholders participate presents a distributional deci-
sion that is typically a matter of real, not corporate, governance, made by politically accounta-
ble decision makers. Under this fourth rationale, these decisions are made by corporate
directors. See Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 19 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018).
12 For example, should a target board prevent its shareholders from considering a bid that
has a 20% premium over the prebid price in order to protect local jobs but permit a bid with a
40% premium to go forward? More generally, what weights should a board attach to share-
holder and stakeholder interests? Should the weights vary with the type of stakeholder? Today,
there are no well-grounded answers to these questions. The theoretical difficulty of deriving
weights for stakeholders is analyzed in Michael Magill et al., A Theory of the Stakeholder
Corporation, 83 ECONOMETRICA 1685, 1722 (2015) (analyzing the theoretical difficulty of
deriving weights for stakeholders).
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that boards can credibly disclose their private information to the market. On
these assumptions, the exchange efficient level of defensive tactics actually
is zero: acquirers should capture all of the expected surplus from an acquisi-
tion. This one-sided split would maximize the incentive of acquirers to find
good targets to buy. The theoretically optimal level of defensive tactics is
impossible to achieve in practice, however, because each target is to some
extent unique. As a consequence, targets have monopoly power in them-
selves and will use that power to extract some surplus from a potentially
efficient deal.13 The question is whether defensive tactics permit targets to
extract too much.
To answer this question, we need two things: a causal theory explaining
how defensive tactics affect corporate control market efficiency and an em-
pirically testable definition of efficiency in this market. Beginning with the
definition, the corporate control market is “exchange inefficient” unless it
maximizes the number of value-increasing “matches” between searching ac-
quirers and saleable targets. A value-increasing match occurs when the value
of the combined company exceeds in expectation the sum of the stand-alone
values of the acquirer and the target.14 To formalize this definition, suppose
that in a period there are M in number potential targets that would increase
in value were they to combine with an acquirer. Let there be N in number
potential acquirers that are searching for targets to buy, one for each. Define
the ratio N/M as s. Then the market inefficiency is 1 - s. To illustrate, assume
that every searching acquirer makes a value-increasing match with a target.
Then N/M = 1 and the acquisition market inefficiency is zero: the market for
corporate control would be perfectly exchange efficient. But let only one-
13 “If the surplus value of the match is divided equally between the partners, then all
agents invest too little in search effort because none accounts for the share of the surplus
gained by the future partner were the agent to make the match. Search efforts made by all in a
Nash equilibrium are efficient when the matchmaker receives all the surplus . . . .” Dale T.
Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 968, 977 (1982). Further, “[a]lthough efficient search obtains when the match-
maker takes all the surplus, the members of any particular pair are not likely to divide the
surplus in this way, ex post. Once they meet, the two face a bilateral bargaining problem with
other more plausible solutions.” Id. at 975.
14 Efficiency is commonly measured in matching markets by whether matches are stable.
See Eduardo M. Azevedo & Jacob D. Leshno, A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-
Sided Matching Markets, 124 J. POL. ECON. 1235, 1237–38 (2016). This measure is satisfied
by definition in the acquisition market for made matches because ownership of the target
transfers to the acquirer. Another efficiency measure appears in the corporate control literature:
the credible threat of a takeover may cause target managers to maximize target returns rather
than behave self-servingly or ineffectively. This conjecture has been difficult to test empiri-
cally. However, a relatively recent paper reported that a rigorous test finds “strong evidence
that the enactment of M&A laws [which reduce barriers to takeovers] increases the sensitivity
of CEO turnover to poor firm performance. . . . [W]e provide evidence that the external
market for corporate control, when available, can be an effective substitute for internal-govern-
ance mechanisms.” Ugur Lel & Darius P. Miller, Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial
Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 1588, 1590 (2015).
Because increasing the ex ante probability of acquisitions increases the pressure on managers
to maximize, the match efficiency measure is consistent with the incentive increasing measure.
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third of the searching acquirers find a good target to match with, so that s =
1/3. Then the market inefficiency is 1 - s = 2/3. The market fails to make
67% of the possible value-increasing matches.
We are interested in two numbers. Even without defensive tactics, po-
tential acquirers will make suboptimal—that is, too few—searches for
targets because the acquirers cannot capture all of the expected surplus from
a deal. The first number we are interested in therefore is the “minimally
achievable market inefficiency.” To illustrate, suppose that acquirer searches
yield a s of 2/3 only because targets can command a portion of the acquisi-
tion gain. Then the minimally achievable market inefficiency is 33%: the
market for corporate control “naturally” fails to make one-third of the possi-
ble value-increasing matches. As the second rationale for defensive tactics
indicated, board control yields higher prices: that is, board control permits a
target to realize a higher fraction of expected deal surplus at the expense of
the searching acquirer.
Our causal theory then follows: defensive tactics would be exchange
inefficient if the reduced surplus shares they yield for acquirers materially
reduce the number of searches the acquirers make and, thus, materially re-
duce the number of good matches the market makes. Thus, the second num-
ber we are interested in is the marginal contribution of defensive tactics to
the market inefficiency. Again, to illustrate, suppose that the (fewer)
searches defensive tactics induce yield a s of 1/3. Then the corporate control
market inefficiency is 67%. Recalling that in our example the minimally
achievable corporate control market inefficiency was one-third, the marginal
contribution of defensive tactics to the market inefficiency would be one-
third.
The ideal way to find the two numbers on which we focus would be to
identify the actual number of potential targets and acquirers in the market for
corporate control in a specified period, then prevent the targets from using
defensive tactics and, finally, find s (the ratio of actual acquisitions to possi-
ble acquisitions). This would reveal the minimally achievable market ineffi-
ciency. The researcher next should retain the same number of acquirers and
targets but now permit the targets to choose privately optimal defensive tac-
tics levels. She would then find the new s. This method would permit the
researcher precisely to identify the marginal contribution of defensive tactics
to the market inefficiency. The problem, however, is that this method obvi-
ously is impossible to implement. And this restates the basic problem with
counterfactual causal analysis: the researcher cannot directly test her causal
theory because she cannot keep everything constant except the variable of
interest. Importantly, the standard empirical fixes for this methodological
problem have not worked in the corporate control market because the empir-
ical researcher cannot recover the data: the actual numbers of good targets
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and acquirers in the corporate control market at any one time.15 As a result,
today no one knows how exchange inefficient the market for corporate con-
trol is.
This article introduces a new empirical method to test for exchange
inefficiency in the market for corporate control. We first create an informal
structural model of the corporate control market. The structural method ap-
plies “models based in economic theory. Structural modeling attempts to use
data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic model, based on
models of individual choice or aggregate relations derived from them.”16 In
our model, there are two types of potential acquirers: (i) firms seeking to
combine with synergy partners to increase the value of the combined firms,
and (ii) firms seeking targets whose performance could be improved by bet-
ter management.17 There are three types of targets: (i) possible synergy part-
ners, (ii) potentially improvable targets, and (iii) “noise firms”—firms that
have chosen defensive tactics levels so high as effectively to opt out of the
market for corporate control.
The model supports three predictions: First, even when potential targets
do not use defensive tactics, inefficiency in the market for corporate control
is high. There are two reasons: (a) targets’ natural monopoly power prevents
acquirers from capturing all of the surplus from matches, and (b) search is
particularly costly in the actual corporate control market because supply-side
heterogeneity is substantial: that is, there are several different possible target
types. Heterogeneity reduces search effectiveness because a searcher cannot
determine whether a firm would be a good acquisition partner without ana-
lyzing the firm in detail. As a consequence, the greater the variety of poten-
tial targets the more likely it is that an acquirer will visit—that is, analyze—
too many firms that the acquirer could not profitably buy; and thereby visit
too few potentially profitable targets. Anticipating that much costly search
could be wasted, potential acquirers will reduce their search intensity ac-
cordingly. This will increase the corporate control market inefficiency. Our
second prediction is that defensive tactics should materially increase that
inefficiency because they materially reduce the surplus share going to poten-
tial acquirers. Third, we predict that a target board that maximizes share-
holder welfare would choose a higher defensive tactics level than would a
social planner. This is because the board only considers the reduction in bids
the target may receive from a high defensive tactics level rather than the
15 Empirical researchers have studied the effect of single defensive tactics, such as a stag-
gered board, but have not studied the current congeries of tactics as a whole. In our view, the
single tactic studies have been illuminating but so far inconclusive. See infra Part IV.2.
16 Aviv Nevo & Michael D. Whinston, Taking the Dogma out of Econometrics: Structural
Modeling and Credible Inference, 24 J. ECON. PERSPS. 69, 69–70 (2010).
17 A synergy acquisition improves value by combining complementary assets (for exam-
ple, a manufacturer combines with a retail distribution network). An acquisition of an improv-
able firm increases value by replacing the current target’s board (and managers) with a board
(and managers) that execute the target’s current strategy more effectively or cause the target to
switch to a better strategy.
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marginal contribution of the firm’s high defensive tactics level to the average
market defensive tactics level. When every potential target’s board considers
only its own company’s welfare, the average market defensive tactics level is
inefficiently high.
We test these theoretical predictions by simulating corporate control
market performance. Following the theory, we specify the number and types
of the potential acquirers and targets and the strategies they pursue: how the
acquirers search and how the targets choose defensive tactics levels. Defen-
sive tactics levels are first permitted only to be weak and then permitted to
be strong.18 The simulation permits us to run the ideal procedure. We can
simulate corporate control market performance when everything is the same
except for the targets’ defensive tactics levels. The simulation thus permits us
to observe the two relevant numbers: the minimally achievable corporate
control market inefficiency and the marginal contribution of defensive tac-
tics to that inefficiency.
The (simulated) evidence is consistent with the theoretical predictions.
The minimally achievable market inefficiency is large and defensive tactics
increase the inefficiency substantially. The second and third predictions to-
gether imply, and we observe, a large marginal contribution of defensive
tactics to corporate control market inefficiency: the simulated market makes
15% fewer acquisitions under the current defensive-tactics-friendly legal re-
gime than would be made under a defensive-tactics-unfriendly legal regime.
The actual corporate control market makes over $1.5 trillion of acquisitions
a year.19 Our simulations thus suggest that the Delaware Supreme Court’s
move, in the 1980s, from the Chancery Court’s defensive-tactics-unfriendly
legal regime, which time-limited defensive tactics, to the current defensive-
tactics-friendly legal regime with no time limit, reduced deal value in the
market for corporate control by close to $200 billion a year.
Turning to shareholder welfare, the simulations permit us to address a
target’s optimal trade-off between bid frequency, which falls as the target’s
defensive tactics level increases, and bid size, which increases as the target’s
defensive tactics level increases. Our simulations together with real world
evidence show, perhaps surprisingly, that target boards choose defensive tac-
tics levels that correspond, more or less, to the theoretically privately opti-
mal levels.20 However, our third prediction is supported: the privately
18 In this article, “weak” defensive tactics connote the surplus share from an acquisition
that a target’s natural—or monopoly—power alone can command. “Strong” or “friendly”
defensive tactics connote the tactics—poison pill, staggered board—that potential targets to-
day are legally permitted to adopt to increase the target’s share.
19 In 2018, the market value of deals for U.S. targets totaled $1.7 trillion. THOMSON
REUTERS, Mergers & Acquisitions Review Legal Advisors 5 (2018).
20 Directors’ faithfulness—that is, their commitment to shareholder welfare—appears to
have evolved over the period since the appearance of significant numbers of hostile takeovers.
As the business culture came to understand that the directors’ obligation in connection with a
hostile takeover was to secure the highest return to shareholders, informal constraints on de-
fensive tactics may have become more important. See Ronald J. Gilson, Catalyzing Corporate
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optimal defensive tactics level exceeds the level that would be exchange
efficient.
These dramatic results do not support an immediate call for regulatory
reform for two distinct reasons. The first is methodological. A simulation is
persuasive to the extent that the variables the researcher uses are accurate
proxies for the real-world variables the researcher cannot observe. We make
the case for the external validity of our variables in Part II below, but the
correspondence between the computer simulation program and the world is
never exact. Therefore, the primary virtue of a simulation is to develop sug-
gestive evidence regarding the magnitudes of the effects that theory predicts
will occur in the relevant market.21
The second reason why we do not advocate immediate reform is sim-
ple: we analyze in depth only two of the four rationales for defensive tactics.
A similarly deep study of the third and fourth rationales, discussed in Part
III, may justify the current high defensive tactics level. But even putting
these two cautions together, the market exchange inefficiency seems so large
that the other rationales would require much stronger empirical and theoreti-
cal support than now exists to justify current law.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I highlights Delaware law’s nar-
row focus regarding defensive tactics. Part II describes the model in detail
and specifies our important assumptions. Part III then describes our simula-
tion program. Part IV presents the simulation market results, and Part V
presents the shareholder welfare result. Part V also discusses the conflict
between private and social efficiency in the corporate control market and
briefly analyzes the defensive tactics rationales we do not consider in detail.
Appendix 1 provides a narrative description of the coding and search algo-
rithms for our simulation program, and Appendices 2, 3, and 4 contain rele-
vant tables. The simulation code itself is available to researchers online.22
I. DELAWARE LAW’S NARROW FOCUS
A board that uses defensive tactics to block a bid may be faithful23 and
correct—the bid is too low—or faithful and mistaken, or unfaithful. Which
of these motives obtains in a particular case is difficult for a court to deter-
mine. The Delaware Supreme Court thus has eschewed an inquiry into mo-
Governance: The Evolution of the United States’ System in the 1980s and 1990s, 24 CO. SEC.
L.J. 143, 153–54 (2006) (reviewing evolution of independent directors’ perceptions of the
change in independent directors’ roles in a hostile takeover).
21 We note a recent methodological observation by two researchers: “simulations have
proven to be useful for generating conjectures, and can be essential for developing quantitative
results.” Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, Wither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of
Learning in Games, 30 J. ECON. PERSPS. 151, 165–66 (2016) (emphasis added). Our interest is
in “quantitative results.”
22
SARAH BRAASCH, CORPORATE CONTROL MARKET – DESIGN AND SIMULATION, https://
sarahbraasch.wixsite.com/corpcontrolmktdesign (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
23 A target board is “faithful” when it uses its power to maximize shareholder welfare
rather than insulate itself from being dismissed after a takeover.
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tive in favor of a rule-like assessment of whether a defensive tactic either is
“draconian” or is “preclusive” of a hostile bid.24 Though a poison pill would
preclude a hostile offer, the Supreme Court explained that the pill is preclu-
sive only if it also makes a successful proxy fight to replace directors in
favor of candidates who would eliminate defensive barriers “mathematically
impossible or realistically unattainable.”25
The Delaware Supreme Court does not ask whether these defensive tac-
tics maximize social welfare. Rather, the court asks only how defensive tac-
tics affect target shareholder welfare given that a potential acquirer has bid.
The court’s narrow focus is understandable, however, because the legal ques-
tion hostile takeover lawsuits present is whether the directors’ response to a
bid violated their fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder welfare, not
whether their decision negatively affected the public or the shareholders of
other companies.26
II. MODEL AND PREDICTIONS
A. A Structural Model
Before introducing our model, we make two comments. Initially, struc-
tural models sometimes are solved analytically: that is, the researcher char-
acterizes the model mathematically and then derives the mathematically
grounded conclusions that the model’s assumptions imply. Some markets,
however, are too complex to admit of precise mathematical treatment given
the modeling strategies that are available to the researcher. That is the case
here. Two types of models characterize markets in which numerous parties
attempt to make deals with each other: search models and matching models.
Search models explore the relation between buyer shopping behavior and
market outcomes, but they fit poorly with the market for corporate control
because in search models the buying side searches while the selling side
chooses prices, the sellers maintain those prices during a relevant period, and
the sellers passively wait for buyers.27 In the corporate control market, by
contrast, a fraction of potential targets actively searches for acquirers who
will buy them, targets do not necessarily maintain their prices (that is, they
24 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1995).
25 Id. at 1387–89.
26 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986)
(limiting board’s consideration of a takeover only to shareholder value rather than considering
its impact on other stakeholders).
27 Galenianos and Kircher provide a general review of search models in which one side
searches and the other side sets prices. See generally Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher,
On the Game-Theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium, 53 INT. ECON. REV. 1
(2012); see also Alan Schwartz, The Sole Owner Standard Reviewed, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 231,
231–32 (1988); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 228, 231–39 (1986).
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may change their defensive levels after being actively searched), and some
targets or sellers are reluctant to accept (or will not accept) an offer to buy.28
Matching models, which explore how well agents match with comple-
mentary agents, also are poor fits because in these models every market
participant is actively seeking to match. In the corporate control market,
some firms—the financial targets and noise firms—prefer not to match.29
Thus, current search and matching models cannot yield mathematically
grounded predictions regarding how an accurately specified market for cor-
porate control functions under the current Delaware defensive-tactics-
friendly legal regime, or how it might function under a defensive-tactics-
unfriendly regime.30
When analytical solutions are unavailing, the researcher can attempt to
solve the model empirically. An empirical solution can take two forms. In
both, the researcher uses the relevant theory—for us, search theory—to de-
rive predictions regarding how the market should perform given the assump-
tions. In the first form, the researcher attempts to find real world evidence
that is consistent with, or contradicts, those predictions. For data unavailabil-
ity reasons, causal theories of the effect defensive tactics have on the market
for corporate control cannot be tested directly. Therefore, we use a more
novel empirical strategy to simulate how the market for corporate control
performs. Our structural model guides the simulation program, and the pro-
gram’s inputs are the assumptions we make about the characteristics of mar-
ket participants and the market’s structure.
Beginning with participants, acquirers in the model search sequentially
for targets to buy and (many fewer) potential targets search for acquirers
with which to merge. An agent searches sequentially by equating the margi-
nal expected value of finding a good target with one more search—another
28 Wenyu Wang recently did solve a structural model of the corporate control market ana-
lytically, but the assumptions that characterized his model are starkly counterfactual. For ex-
ample, Wang assumed that firms do not use defensive tactics and that every firm that could
benefit from an acquisition seeks to match. See Wenyu Wang, Bid Anticipation, Information
Revelation and Merger Gains, 128 J. FIN. ECON. 320, 337 (2018). The model thus is unhelpful
to the researcher who seeks to understand a market in which defensive tactics are ubiquitous,
and some firms prefer to remain independent.
29 In the usual matching model, persons search for spouses, or firms search for employees
while employees search for firms.
30 Straska and Waller extensively review the literature concerning the effect on share-
holder wealth of antitakeover provisions. See Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory Waller, An-
titakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANALYSIS 933, 941 (2014). According to these authors, the literature reaches no firm conclu-
sions. Thus, they suggest as a question for future research: “Does an optimal value-maximiz-
ing number of antitakeover provisions exist?” Id. at 953. Current data also is compromised by
what appear to be errors in the coding of the databases typically used to identify companies’
existing defensive tactics. See generally Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and
Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629 (2016); David F. Larcker, Peter C.
Reiss & Youfei Xiao, Corporate Governance Data and Measures Revisited (Rock Center for
Corp. Gov., Working Paper No. 213, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2694802; Michael
Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1364
(2013).
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detailed analysis of a potential target—to the cost of that search. We assume
that acquirer search costs are quadratic: that is, the cost of a second search
exceeds the cost of the first search; the cost of the third search exceeds the
cost of the second search; and so forth.31 As a consequence of this assump-
tion, an acquirer either will make a good match or exit the market before
matching because the increased cost of its next search would exceed the
expected gain.
A potential target (who is not searching) has a different maximization
problem. In the model, the target’s task is to choose a defensive tactics level.
This is not simple because strong defensive tactics increase the target’s gain
from an acquisition, conditional on the target receiving a bid, but a high
defensive tactics level reduces the probability of receiving a bid (because the
lower the acquirer’s expected gain from a made deal is, the lower the poten-
tial acquirer’s incentive to search for such a deal).
To isolate the exchange efficiency effect of defensive tactics, we as-
sume that target boards maximize their companies’ expected return from an
acquisition. A faithful board chooses the defensive tactics level that imple-
ments its company’s optimal trade-off between maximizing the probability
of a bid and maximizing the price conditional on a bid actually occurring.
The market is populated with many potential targets and many potential
acquirers.32 There are three target types. A “synergy target” is maximizing
expected returns from its assets and business model, and so would not do
better under different management. However, the synergy target’s assets may
complement the assets of at least one of the potential acquirers. A value-
increasing match would occur when two firms with complementary assets
conclude a deal. A “financial target” does not maximize expected returns. A
value-increasing match would occur if an acquirer with the ability to im-
prove firm performance finds a financial target. A “noise firm” is not a
target: the firm, that is, would reject every bid.
There are two acquirer types. A “synergy buyer” searches for an effi-
cient synergy target. We assume that this searcher lacks the technology to
improve firm performance other than by combining complementary assets
and so would not bid for a financial target if the searcher discovered one. A
“financial buyer” searches for targets whose performance the acquirer has
the capacity to improve. We assume that a financial buyer is not a synergy
match for, and so would not bid for, a synergy target.33 Some synergy targets
search for acquirers with which to match. For reasons detailed below, we
assume that many more acquirers search than do targets. Hence, we focus on
acquirer search, but note here that target search and acquirer search are com-
plements: theory predicts and our simulations show that the probability that
31 We motivate the assumption of quadratic search costs in Part III infra.
32 We set our assumptions out largely in narrative form.
33 Financial buyers usually are private equity firms whose only “asset” is the ability to
improve target performance, often by causing the target to cease certain business strategies or
to choose others.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 16 12-MAR-21 14:04
16 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 11
an acquirer and a target will match is higher when acquirers and targets both
search.
The corporate control market is “semi-strong information efficient.”34
Therefore, a potential target’s market price—price per share times the num-
ber of shares—approximates the target’s stand-alone value plus the expected
premium from a possible bid. This assumption importantly implies that
every successful acquisition is ex ante exchange efficient because a willing
buyer and a willing seller concluded it. A potential acquirer would not bid
unless it believed that it would realize value in excess of the bid price and
the target’s board would not recommend that its shareholders accept a bid
unless the bid exceeded the probable target shareholders’ reservation price,
which exceeds the target’s stand-alone value.35 Failed acquisitions, however,
are not necessarily efficient. A target board may reject a value-increasing bid
because it wants to remain independent or because it mistakenly believes
that the target can do better by remaining independent.
34 Semi-strong efficiency exists in the market for corporate control when the market price
of a company (price per share times number of shares) incorporates all public information
relevant to the company’s value. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 556–57 (1984). The assumption is particularly
plausible in the acquisition context. A board that opposes an offer based on private information
can release that information and so make the market more informationally efficient. While the
effectiveness of disclosure is limited by the strategic costs of disclosure or by the difficulty of
making a credible disclosure given the target board’s potentially mixed motivations, the option
to disclose does move the target’s price toward information efficiency.
35 Recent evidence is consistent with our assumption that many matches are ex ante effi-
cient. See Matthew D. Cain, Stephen B. McKeon & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Do Takeover
Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers, 124 J. FIN ECON. 464, 480
(2017) (“Column 1 reports a strong and economically significant correlation between takeover
susceptibility and firm value, indicating that firm value is increasing in its susceptibility to
hostile takeovers.”); Asli M. Arikan & René M. Stulz, Corporate Acquisitions, Diversifica-
tion, and the Firm’s Life Cycle, 71 J. FIN. 139, 140–41 (2016) (“We find strong support for the
predictions of neoclassical theories that acquisitions are made by better-performing firms and
firms with better growth opportunities, and that acquisitions create value. . . . Our evidence of
a positive relation between a firm’s acquisition rate and its Tobin’s q supports the neoclassical
view of acquisitions, which holds that firms use acquisitions to reallocate corporate assets to
more productive uses.”); Vojislav Maksimovic, Gordon Phillips & Liu Yang, Private and Pub-
lic Merger Waves, 68 J. FIN. 2177, 2179 (2013) (“We find that acquisitions are efficiency
improving, both on and off the [merger] wave.”). Wang, supra note 29, at 337, applies his
structural matching model of the M&A market to data and finds that “the value of an active
merger market is estimated to be 12.56% for an average acquirer and 47.32% for an average
target.” Ran Duchin & Breno Schmidt, Riding the Merger Wave: Uncertainty, Reduced Moni-
toring, and Bad Acquisitions, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 69, 69, 71 (2013) is in part consistent with
these conclusions; it finds favorable results for mergers in general but less favorable results for
acquisitions that take place during a wave of acquisitions. A potentially large source of ineffi-
ciency exists in stock for stock mergers because acquirers may bid with overvalued shares
based on private information available only to the bidder, thereby purchasing targets though
other possible bidders have higher valuations. Li et al. use a structural model to estimate the
magnitude of the inefficiency, with a sample of 2,503 deals from 1980 to 2013, finding “that
an overvalued bidder crowds out a bidder with a higher synergy in 7.0% of deals . . . the
aggregate efficiency loss is 0.63% of the target’s preannouncement value, with a standard error
of 0.19%.” Di Li, Lucian A. Taylor & Wenyu Wang, Inefficiencies and Externalities from
Opportunistic Acquirers, 130 J. Fin. Econ. 265, 267 (2018).
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At the beginning of a market period, potential targets choose their de-
fensive tactics levels and potential acquirers choose their search strategies.
Acquirers know the average market defensive tactics level but not the level
at particular firms. To learn that, and other relevant information, the acquirer
must investigate.36 Because a target board can adopt a poison pill quickly,
however, and because pills increase target bargaining power, potential ac-
quirers (in our simulations and in actual practice) assume that every target
will have a pill when an offer is made.37 While an individual target cannot
affect the market average defensive tactics level by the level it chooses, the
target can affect the probability that it will be bought. A sequential searcher
may pass on a firm whose defensive tactics level seems high in light of the
acquirer’s view of the distribution of defensive tactics levels in the market.
The targets in our model thus act as do sellers in standard search models,
whose choice of a price—here a defensive tactics level—cannot affect the
market price distribution but can affect the individual seller’s demand. Fi-
nally, a potential target can increase the cost of buying it after receiving a
bid—for example, by finding competitive bidders.38
B. Predictions
This model generates three qualitative predictions:39
36 We follow the standard convention in search models that sellers do not advertise: a
searcher can learn the firm’s price only by investigating the firm. Because, we later show,
defensive tactics largely determine prices, we thus assume that a potential acquirer can learn
how a potential target’s defensive tactics level affects the division of expected deal surplus
only by investigating the target.
37 See Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills 48 J.LEG. STUD.
1 (2019)  ; see also John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique
of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 298 (2000).
38 It is not customary to include information intermediaries in search models, but invest-
ment banks sometimes play an intermediary role in the market for corporate control. To see
why we do not take into account investment banks, consider “conjunctive search” for goods:
the searcher screens potential products using one or two “cutoff attribute levels” such as prod-
uct safety. The searcher then makes full attribute comparisons over the products that survive
the screen. In the market for corporate control, the bankers sometimes perform the first of
these functions: identifying a subset of firms in which an acquirer is likely to be interested. The
acquirer then makes a full investigation of a fraction, or all, of the potential targets in the
subset. Define the cost of creating the screened subset cs and the cost of making a full compari-
son cf, so c = cs + cf. Impressionistic evidence suggests that cs/c is small: the majority of
acquirer costs is incurred in making full investigations. Some acquirers use investment bankers
while others do not, but the relative fraction of banker users is unknown. For these reasons, we
let cs = 0. Relaxing this assumption would have an ambiguous effect on our results. On the
one hand, search costs would increase to include bankers’ fees; on the other hand, bankers may
increase the probability that an acquirer finds a good target. We do not characterize this trade-
off here.
39 A qualitative prediction can be signed but is imprecise. For example, increasing defen-
sive tactics levels reduces acquirer search. The benefit of a simulation is that it adds precision
to a qualitative prediction. For example, our simulations show how many draws—that is,
searches of firms—an acquirer makes under weak and then under strong defensive tactic
levels.
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One: The minimally achievable corporate control market inefficiency
would be high even if defensive tactics were banned. This is because ac-
quirer search is suboptimal.40 There are three reasons: search is especially
costly, insufficiently rewarding, and ineffective at locating good targets. In
the usual search model, agents search for low prices, and price information
is convenient to access. In the market for corporate control, acquirers search
for matching targets but match information is costly to acquire. Whether a
potential target is a good synergy match for a strategic buyer commonly
requires investigation into how combining the two firms would produce a
larger joint gain. Similarly, whether and by how much a financial buyer
could improve a potential target commonly requires careful investigation
and (usually) access to non-public information concerning the nature of ex-
isting management’s failures and the extent to which an acquirer’s manage-
ment has the skills to eliminate or ameliorate those failures. In addition, both
types of acquirers must identify and evaluate the efficacy of each potential
target’s defensive tactics level.
Further, acquirer search could be socially efficient only if the acquirer
could capture the full return from searching. But as explained in the Intro-
duction, targets are not fungible, which implies that each target has some
monopoly power. As a result, concluding an acquisition or match necessarily
requires bilateral bargaining in which, after a potential acquirer finds an ap-
propriate target, the two sides negotiate to divide the expected match gain.
Finally, heterogeneity among potential targets reduces search effective-
ness because it increases the number of wasted searches: searches in which
an acquirer “hits on” the wrong target.41 For example, a financial buyer may
find a target that would only be valuable as a synergy partner. Similarly, a
synergy buyer may find a target that requires improvement. Finally, either
buyer type may find a noise firm, which is not for sale. The costs of deter-
mining that an acquirer had found the wrong partner type or a noise firm are
wasted. Wasted searches are especially inefficient in our structural model
because search costs increase in the number of prior searches. To explain
this effect, consider a sequence of three searches: the first costs $100, the
second $110, and the third $120. An acquirer initially hits a noise firm,
which is a wasted search. But now, the second and third searches, over po-
tentially profitable matches, become the first and second searches. In effect,
because the acquirer wasted a $100 search, it is restricted to two draws from
the distribution of possible good matches, with the first draw costing $110
40 Acquirer search is suboptimal because acquirers do not equate the social marginal gain
to their private marginal cost. Rather, acquirers equate their private marginal gain to their
private marginal cost. Because the private marginal gain is less than the social marginal gain,
acquirers stop searching before a social planner would want them to stop. The text next ex-
plains why acquirers truncate search.
41 Schwartz and Wilde first show that search becomes less effective as goods for sale
become more heterogeneous. Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in
Markets for Heterogeneous Goods Under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with
Policy Implications, 13 BELL J. ECON. 181, 182 (1982).
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and second costing $120. In short, wasted searches increase the cost of pro-
ductive searches. The consequence is to increase the probability that a poten-
tial acquirer will exit the market before it matches. And for these three
reasons, acquirer search is suboptimal, so that the corporate control market,
even in the pre defensive tactics era, should have been materially exchange
inefficient.
Two: The marginal contribution of defensive tactics to the market ineffi-
ciency is large. There are two reasons. To understand the first, suppose that
heterogeneity is absent: all targets are alike. Defensive tactics nevertheless
increase a target’s bargaining power in an acquisition negotiation above the
power the target’s monopoly power alone could command.42 The less match
surplus searching acquirers expect to realize, the lower is acquirer search
intensity. Second, and more subtly, supply side heterogeneity and defensive
tactics should be mutually (negatively) reinforcing. As just argued, defensive
tactics reduce the acquirer’s gain from search, and supply side heterogeneity
increases the acquirer’s cost of search. The combination of strong defensive
tactics and supply side heterogeneity thus should reduce acquirer search in-
tensity more than either factor alone could do.
Three: A faithful target board chooses a defensive tactics level that (a)
permits an acquirer to share in the expected surplus from a match, but (b)
exceeds the socially efficient level. Regarding (a), potential acquirers that
expect to receive no portion of the surplus from the transaction will not
search, so the target would receive no bids. Regarding (b), a faithful target
board chooses the defensive tactics level that optimizes the trade-off be-
tween maximizing target surplus conditional on receiving a bid and maxi-
mizing bid frequency. The board, however, will not consider the effect of its
choice on the market average defensive tactics level. Because every board
considers only its own shareholders’ welfare, the market average defensive
tactics level will exceed the socially efficient level.43
Theory yields these predictions, but the decision maker would like to
know the magnitude of the predicted effects. The public decision maker—a
legislature, say—cannot control the number and type of targets in the market
and their intrinsic uniqueness. The decision maker, however, can control the
level of defensive tactics firms choose. The policy-relevant empirical issue
thus concerns the marginal contribution of defensive tactics to the market
inefficiency. The greater that contribution is, the less efficient the current
Delaware defensive-tactics-friendly law becomes. For the reasons set out in
the Introduction, assessing the magnitude of defensive tactics’ marginal con-
tribution cannot be done “naturally” because the researcher cannot observe
the number and type of targets that are available to buy. As well, the private
42 Part VI infra explains in detail how defensive tactics increase target bargaining power.
43 We describe here a standard search externality: sellers choose prices or contract terms
without taking into account the effect of their choices on the total amount of search in the
market.
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welfare question—the strategy that best serves target shareholders—turns on
the number of bids that a particular firm’s defensive tactics level deterred,
but the researcher cannot observe unmade bids. A simulation overcomes
these limitations for the simulated market.
III. PROXY VARIABLES AND SIMULATED SEARCH
A corporate control market simulation specifies search strategies for
acquirers (and searching targets) and defensive tactics strategies for targets.
The simulation also specifies the different surplus divisions between ac-
quirers and targets that different legal regimes governing defensive tactics
yield. Finally, the simulation specifies parameter values: (a) the total number
of matches that it is possible for agents to make—the m in our social welfare
measure; (b) the number of acquirers and targets in the market and their
types; and (c) the cost function for searching acquirers.
A. Market Participants
We simulate the takeover market for public companies. Hence, our ac-
tors maximize expected monetary returns. A target is a firm that would be a
good match for the appropriate acquirer, and an acquirer makes at most one
match per period. In this, Part III.A, we discuss how we chose the number of
agents of each type in the simulated market and the ratios among them. Part
III.B then describes the acquirers’ search strategy and derives the surplus
splits under the two legal regimes: defensive-tactics-friendly and
unfriendly.44
The actual number of good targets in the market in any period is not
observable, but the number and type of acquisitions that took place in that
period is observable. For two reasons, we suppose that the ratio of actual
synergy acquisitions to actual financial acquisitions should reflect the true
ratio of synergy targets to financial targets in the full market population.
First, if the observed acquisition ratio is consistent across time—say at three
to one—there should be roughly three times as many potentially good syn-
ergy matches as financial matches in the market at large unless it is much
less costly for a synergy buyer to evaluate a potential synergy match than it
is for a financial buyer to evaluate a financial match. There is no reason to
believe that such a cost difference exists.
Our second reason follows from statistical analysis. Consider an urn
that has red balls and white balls: the total number of balls and the ratio of
44 Burkart and Raff’s model has shareholders permitting managers to make ex ante ineffi-
cient acquisitions (that generate private benefits for the managers) to induce the managers to
exert high effort in earlier periods. In our model, acquirers maximize expected utility by mak-
ing matches. We do not consider the Burkart and Raff possibility because it is difficult to
assess the magnitude of the effect. Mike Burkart & Konrad Raff, Performance Pay, CEO
Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers, 19 REV. FIN. 1383, 1409 (2015).
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red balls to white balls are unknown. An experimental subject will draw ten
balls from the urn, each time returning the chosen ball to the urn, and then
estimate the red-to-white ratio. The initially uninformed experimental sub-
ject’s rational strategy would begin with the assumption that the experi-
menter filled the urn randomly. On this assumption, there should be a fifty-
fifty division of red and white balls in the urn. Now suppose that, on her
initial try, the subject draws three red balls and seven white balls. A rational
subject would update her initial belief to suppose that the urn contains con-
siderably fewer red balls than white balls.45 Let the subject then repeat the
ten-draw process four more times. On average, she consistently draws three
red balls and seven white balls. Using the ten draw process, the experimental
subject should believe that the urn population is much closer to a ratio of
three red balls to seven white balls than to a ratio of half of each (though the
subject still would not know how many balls in total the urn contains).
We assume that nature distributes potential target types in the corporate
control market. Accordingly, we suppose that each completed acquisition is
analogous to the draw of a ball from an urn the total population of which is
unknown. We have five years of data, which is equivalent to five draws from
the urn. If the ratio of actual synergy to financial acquisitions is consistent
across time, statistical analysis supports the view that the synergy-financial
acquisition ratio approximately reflects the true market ratio. Both intuitive
and statistical reasonings suggest, therefore, that the data regarding actual
acquisitions are informative about the market population.
Turning to the data, Table 1 contains for recent years the number of
acquisitions in which the acquiring company was public (a synergy-moti-
vated match) or private (a financially motivated match).
45 If the ratio of red balls to white balls in the urn is .5, the binomial formula shows that
the chance of the subject drawing three red balls in ten trials is 11.7%. The formula is
where the number of trials is n = 10, the number of successes is k = 3 (that is, red balls
drawn), and the assumed probability of red balls in the urn is p = .5.
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TABLE 1. U.S. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACQUIRERS
(SOURCE: BLOOMBERG LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS,
DEAL ATTRIBUTES)
Year Total Acquisitions of  






2016 473 341 132 72.09 
2015 415 278 137 66.98 
2014 348 261 87 75.0 
2013 335 232 103 69.25 
2012 344 245 99 71.22 
Explanation for choices: 
1. Target has to be public (otherwise defensive tactics issue doesn’t arise) 
2. Public acquirer is a proxy for strategic searcher 
3. Private acquirer is a proxy for financial searcher 
Table 1 exhibits a consistent ratio between synergistic and financial ac-
quisitions: between 2012 and 2016, synergy acquisitions averaged about
70% of the total, with a standard deviation of 2.7%.46
The market also contains noise firms, which are not for sale. When we
interviewed market participants about how a potential target responded to an
inquiry to buy, the most common response the participants received was that
the target “is not for sale.” Actual searching firms also remarked that they
hit many “dry holes”—targets that were costly to search but that ultimately
proved not to be a match. We reflected these answers in our simulations by
assuming that noise firms are a large fraction of the firms over which poten-
tial acquirers may search.
To complete our market description, we let there be relatively few syn-
ergy targets who search. There are three reasons. First, search for synergy
partners requires a different skill set than running a business; many firms in
the normal course specialize in running their businesses but will consider a
good offer should one appear.47 Second, a synergy-seeking firm can either
buy a synergy target or recast itself as a synergy target and sell itself to
another firm. Success in a synergy-motivated acquisition requires both
search and implementation skills. We classify synergy seekers that want to
buy—those who believe they have implementation skills—as acquirers.
Consistent with this analysis, impressionistic evidence suggests that non-dis-
tressed firms seldom attempt to sell themselves. Finally, synergy search is an
46 The Table is drawn from Bloomberg Law, Mergers and Acquisitions. We also searched
FactSet for acquisitions during the same period. The FactSet database has fewer acquisitions in
each category but the ratio of synergy acquisitions to financial acquisitions is approximately
the same. The FactSet Table is in Appendix 4.
47 Gilson, supra note 7, at 54–55.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 23 12-MAR-21 14:04
2021] An Efficiency Analysis of Defensive Tactics 23
endgame: the target synergy searcher wants to sell itself. In contrast, ac-
quirer search is common, with some acquirers making repeated acquisi-
tions.48 The number of searchers for a particular target type should be a
function of the number of targets of that type acquirers expect the market to
contain. We use this reasoning to suppose that the ratio of synergy searchers
to financial searchers approximates the ratio of synergy targets to financial
targets.
The actual numbers we used for the simulations are: passive synergy
targets, 96; active synergy targets that search for acquirers, 4;49 materially
improvable targets, 50; noise firms, 525; synergy searchers, 295; and finan-
cial searchers, 130. A little less than 70% of the simulated targets would be
synergy matches, and a little more than 30% would be improvable matches.
Hence, 19% of the total firms over which acquirers search in the simulated
market (150/775) are “targets”: firms that would be good matches for the
appropriate acquirers. Given what market participants report about the diffi-
culty of finding matches, this percentage may be high. We chose it because
we wanted to analyze the strongest case for current law. The higher the ratio
of actual targets to total firms, the more productive an acquirer’s search for
targets should be, even under strong defensive tactics.
B. Strategies, Search Costs, and Surplus Splits
Choosing a defensive tactics level is effectively choosing a price be-
cause the level determines the split of acquisition surplus.50 Thus, we follow
the convention of assuming that searchers learn the prices at particular firms
only by investigating those firms. Searching for targets in the corporate con-
trol market, however, differs from searching for prices in standard search
48 See Andrey Golubov, Alfred Yawson & Huizhong Zhang, Extraordinary Acquirers,
116 J. FIN. ECON. 314, 315 (2015); Nihat Aktas, Eric de Bodt & Richard Roll, Learning from
Repetitive Acquisitions: Evidence from the Time Between Deals, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 104
(2013); see also Ludovic Phalippou, Fangming Xu & Huainan Zhao, Acquiring Acquirers, 19
REV. FIN. 1489, 1528 (2015).
49 In additional simulations (available on request), and holding the other parameters con-
stant, s (the ratio of made matches to total available matches) did not materially increase as the
number of synergy searchers increased until these searchers comprised much more than 10%
of the total synergy targets in the simulated market. For the reasons in text, this is an unrealisti-
cally high fraction. Because s is insensitive to increases in the number of searching targets
below 10%, we use the apparently realistic number of four searching targets.
50 Regarding the relation between defensive tactics and bid prices, define an acquirer’s
value from an acquisition as v and the target’s cost—its standalone value—as c. The deal
surplus thus is S = v - c. Then let the acquirer’s share of the deal surplus, as a function of the
target’s defensive tactics level, be l (0 < l < 1) and let the acquirer’s bid be b. The acquirer’s
net gain from the deal thus is v - b = lS: that is, the acquirer’s gain is the share of the surplus
the acquirer can realize under the defensive tactics level the seller chose. Rearranging terms,
the bid must be b = v - lS. The lower the acquirer’s surplus share is (that is, the smaller l is),
the higher the acquirer’s bid must be. Intuitively, defensive tactics create the target’s bargaining
power: the higher the defensive tactics level, the more bargaining power the target has. Targets
use strong bargaining power—that is, larger surplus shares—to extract higher prices from
acquirers.
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models. While prices are immediately apparent in search models, determin-
ing a potential target’s defensive tactics level and hence the likely price nec-
essary to accomplish the acquisition requires investigation.
There are two search strategies in the search literature: sequential
search and fixed sample size search. When search is sequential, the acquirer
searches until the marginal cost of the next target search equals the expected
marginal gain. In contrast, when the agent searches over a preset universe,
the agent chooses a sample size to explore before beginning, and buys at the
best price her sample revealed.51 Our model supposes that acquirers search
sequentially because fixed sample size search is unrealistic in the corporate
control context. An agent searching pursuant to a fixed sample size strategy
would return to an earlier draw if it yielded the lowest price. Fixed sample
size models thus assume that sellers do not alter their prices after buyers
visit them. In contrast, a searched target is likely to learn that it is in play.
The target may then use the defensive tactics that it had adopted to increase
the price. For example, a firm with poison pill protection may attempt to
attract competing bidders. The corporate control market searcher thus sel-
dom can return to the “same” firm that it initially visited because, in a
Heisenberg-like effect, the initial visit changes the target. Therefore, agents
in our model search sequentially: that is, they search until the agent finds a
target, or the next search would yield a negative expected gain.
We set the costs of an initial search at about 2% of the match surplus.52
The researcher may assume either constant or increasing search costs. In-
51 Honka and Chintagunta provide a more extensive definition: “We study two search
methods, namely, simultaneous and sequential search. Under a simultaneous [that is, fixed
sample size] search strategy, the consumer samples a fixed number of alternatives and
purchases the alternative with the lowest price (or highest utility) in this set. The set of alterna-
tives searched is obtained by looking at the subset for which the expected maximum utility net
of search costs is the highest among all possible subsets. A limitation of the simultaneous
search strategy is that it does not take into account new information that the consumer might
obtain during the search process. So if the consumer observes a very low price (or very high
utility) for an alternative early in the search process, the benefit from an additional search may
be below the marginal cost of that search. In a sequential search strategy, on the other hand,
the number of alternatives searched is not fixed, but is a random variable that depends on the
outcome of the search; this allows a consumer to economize on information costs. In this case,
the consumer weighs the expected benefits and costs of gathering additional price information
after each new quote is obtained. If an acceptable price is obtained early on, the expected gains
from additional searches are small and there is no need to pay the cost of additional searches
. . . .” Elisabeth Honka & Pradeep Chintagunta, Simultaneous or Sequential? Search Strategies
in the U.S. Auto Insurance Industry, 36 MKTG. SCI. 21, 21–22 (2017). A more technical defini-
tion of sequential search holds that the agent begins searching with a reservation value—the
acceptable value of a deal—and continues searching until the current option less the cost of
another draw equals the reservation value. Taking the next draw thus would yield a negative
return. See Jean-Michel Benkert, Igor Letina & Georg Nöldeke, Optimal Search from Multiple
Distributions with Infinite Horizon 6 (U. of Zurich Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 262,
2017). Our simulated agents follow this search rule.
52 Data about actual acquirer search costs is difficult to observe. Breakup fees compensate
a bidder for costs incurred if a target that provisionally accepted a bid changes its mind. These
fees are observable and today approximate 4% of deal value. Fernsn Restrepo & Guhan Sub-
ramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2017). An acquirer
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creasing costs is more realistic here because both synergy and financial ac-
quirers order search. An acquirer begins its search with possible targets that,
as its prior knowledge suggests, may be good matches. These targets would
be less costly to evaluate than firms with which the acquirer is less familiar.
If the acquirer has not matched, it will search for less familiar targets that
should be costlier to evaluate. In the simulations, then, search costs increase
as the searcher analyzes more possible targets.53
The empirical researcher cannot conveniently observe actual surplus
splits. However, we can derive the simulated splits we use for the two legal
regimes from actual market data. To see how we proceed, let p be the (cor-
rect) pre bid market price of the target; p thus is the target’s cost of accepting
a bid. The acquirer’s value for the target is v; the winning bid is b. We let b
= (1 + a)p, where 0 < a < ∞ is the premium acquirers pay; and v = (1 +
b)p, where 0 < b ≤ ∞ is the gross value the acquirer expects to realize. Note
that both the bid and the value are specified as a function of the target’s pre
bid price p. The acquirer’s return is value less price: v - b, or (1 + b)p – (1 +
a)p = p(b - a). The match surplus is value less cost, or: (1 + b)p - p = pb.
The successful acquirer realizes l of the surplus from a completed transac-
tion, where l is the buyer’s gain divided by the match surplus, or
. This is less than one because a > 0 and b > a.
Regarding the surplus shares we use, a paper studied 5,136 takeover
contests between 1988 and 2006 (during which time the legal regime was
friendly to defensive tactics) and found an average premium above the pre
bid price of 50% (the a in the algorithm derived above) and estimated an
average acquirer value above the pre bid price of .81 (the b).54 Using our
that receives a breakup fee, however, has concluded its initial search, begun due diligence and
negotiated with the target. We are interested in the first of these costs—deciding whether a
potential target would be a good match. We let that cost be half the breakup fee average.
53 In the simulations, the surplus from a deal is 100 utils, which sellers and buyers divide.
The MATLAB code sets the cost of searching over one potential target as minus 2 utils. Search
costs increase as the agent searches more possible targets under the rule: search costs = 2 +
(number/2)2 - .25. This function is quadratic over whole integers such as the number of sequen-
tial searches an acquirer makes. Constant marginal search costs would be a plausible assump-
tion if every seller is as convenient to evaluate as every other seller. Standard search models
thus often assume constant marginal search costs because the agent is observing each visited
firm’s price. In contrast, we argue that it is costlier for an acquirer to investigate (visit in search
theory terms), say, the third potential target than to visit the first because acquirers begin with
the potential targets (or industries) they know best. Consumers behave in the way we assume
firms behave: that is, consumers order search beginning with the product that they believe is
likely to generate the highest match utility and be the least costly to evaluate. See Mark Arm-
strong, Ordered Consumer Search, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 989, 990 (2017).
54 See Dimopoulos & Sacchetto, supra note 11, at 444–45, 468. Recent data regarding
premiums, adjusted for the market anticipating a deal, is consistent with the earlier data. When
the market anticipates a deal, the target’s share price will increase above its standalone value to
reflect a part of the match surplus the target could capture from a bidder. Hence, measuring the
true deal premium by the difference between the bid and the target’s share price when a deal
closes understates how much the acquirer must pay above the target’s standalone value. Re-
flecting this analysis, a study of acquisitions between 2001 and 2010 found a premium over the
target’s price when the market first learned that the company was in play of 51.4%. See Harold
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algorithm for l, an acquirer’s surplus share from completing an acquisition
would be .39. Because market participants believe that premiums may have
fallen in recent years, our simulations use a surplus split of .4 for acquirers
and .6 for targets when defensive tactics are strong. We lack firm data for the
defensive-tactics-unfriendly regime. Market participants estimate premiums
then to be around 30% above the pre bid price. If bidder valuations were
then as they are now, a successful bidder would have received 63% of the
surplus.55 Our simulations use a conservative defensive-tactics-unfriendly re-
gime split of .6 for acquirers and .4 for targets.
A potential acquirer, however, will discount its surplus share by the
probability that it will not buy a promising target its search uncovers. There
are two reasons. First, an acquirer is imperfectly informed about a potential
target’s reservation price and the target is imperfectly informed about the
acquirer’s value. Attempted deals when both parties are uninformed some-
times fail. We do not analyze this cause of deal failure but note its qualitative
effect below. Second, a target may interest other bidders. We represent this
second effect formally as follows: the probability that the first searcher to
discover the target buys it is denoted x. The probability that the target runs
an auction is y. If the target does run an auction, the probability that the first
acquirer succeeds is the probability, z, that the acquirer is the highest valuing
bidder. The probability that the first acquirer buys thus is
x = (1 – y) + yz
Importantly, y, the auction probability, is increasing in the defensive tactics
level because strong defensive tactics give the target time to interest other
possible bidders. As y increases, the probability that the first searcher buys
the target falls.
Turning to the data, a study estimated the fraction of initial bidders that
acquire targets as .9. However, this fraction falls if other bidders enter.56
Mulherin & Serif Aziz Simsir, Measuring Deal Premiums in Takeovers, 44 FIN. MGMT. 1, 10
(2015). A more recent paper found an average deal premium, measured a week before deal
closing, of 36%, but the paper also estimated the “embedded premium”—the portion of the
target’s share price that reflected the possibility that the target may be acquired—at 10%.
Benjamin Bennett & Robert Dam, Merger Activity, Stock Prices, and Measuring Gains from
M&A 2, 31 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3000574. The deals these papers studied also occurred under the
current strong defensive tactics regime. In those deals, the real average premium thus exceeded
46%. Id.; see also Mulherin & Simsir, supra, at 10. An acquirer’s total cost includes the bid,
transaction costs, and deal implementation costs. Hence, the finding that the acquirer’s value
(the â parameter) was .81 is plausible and is the figure we use.
55 Firms in Wang’s structural model of the M&A market do not use defensive tactics (so
all efficient matches are consummated). Thus, his market is similar to the pre-1985 defensive-
tactics-unfriendly legal regime we analyze. Using more current data, he estimates the ac-
quirer’s share of deal surplus as 0.629, which is essentially identical to our estimate of 0.630.
See Wang, supra note 29, at 41. As the text states, we use a slightly lower acquirer share in the
simulations to make the strongest case for defensive tactics.
56 See Dimopoulos & Sacchetto, supra note 11, at 462. Heron and Lie also find that multi-
ple entrants reduce the likelihood that the initial bidder succeeds but do not increase the
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Another study estimated the fraction of single bidder contests that succeed as
.74 and the number of auctions that result in sales to one of the bidders as
.78.57 We use this data and our analysis to suppose (a) every target that is
visited by an acquirer with whom it would be a good match sells to some-
one, and (b) the probability that a searching acquirer buys the target is mate-
rially lower when the defensive tactics level is high.
IV. RESULTS I: EXCHANGE EFFICIENCY
A. How the Simulations Work58
The simulated model calculates the expected utility of acquirers (and
targets) that search sequentially using our cost parameters, an assumed total
value of a match (as a multiple of assumed acquisition costs) and an as-
sumed split.59 An agent’s expected utility from a search is reported as the
average of a thousand simulations for each one of the possible draws. How
many acquisitions take place in the control market is a function of acquirer
search intensity because every acquirer searches, but a target can only match
with an acquirer.
Turning to the corporate control market inefficiency, we calculate the
probability that a particular target will match given the number of searches
acquirers who want to buy targets of that type make. For example, if finan-
cial acquirers would optimally make three searches for possible improvable
targets, we solve for the probability that an acquirer will buy such a target
when its search intensity is three. We then multiply the total number of im-
provable targets in the market by this probability to get the number of im-
provable target matches. We repeat this exercise for synergy targets. The
sum of the mismanaged and synergy matches together is the total number of
matches. Dividing the number of made matches by the number of ex ante
efficient matches that the market could make yields the market s. The mar-
ket inefficiency is 1 - s. Finally, our tables often specify a whole number
plus a fraction: that is, there are 5.3 matches. Because we do thousands of
simulations, such a result means that agents make five matches under the
specified parameters with a 30% chance of making a sixth.
probability that the target remains independent. See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, The Effect of
Poison Pill Adoptions and Court Rulings on Firm Entrenchment, 35 J. CORP. FIN. 286, 287
(2015).
57 See Thomas W. Bates, David A. Becher & Michael L. Lemmon, Board Classification
and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN.
ECON. 656, 665 (2008).
58 Appendix 1 more extensively describes how the model unfolds; our online Appendix
sets out the simulation program code. See BRAASCH, supra note 23.
59 Recalling that the program measures results in utils, we report expected utility as whole
numbers and fractions of utils: for example, 2.35.
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B. The Exchange Efficiency Result
The central empirical question we address is the marginal contribution
of defensive tactics to the corporate control market inefficiency. We begin
our empirical approach to this question with a “base case” as a benchmark.
There is no heterogeneity in the base case: all acquirers are identical as are
all targets. To facilitate reading, we summarize the results here.60
The market inefficiency should be lower in the base case market than in
the actual corporate control market because every target is a good match for
every acquirer; a wasted search can occur only when a searcher hits a noise
firm. Importantly, because there is no heterogeneity among the target sellers,
the base case is an almost pure test of how different surplus splits affect the
corporate control market inefficiency. When defensive tactics are weak—
acquirers capture 60% of expected match surplus—the market inefficiency
is about 16%. Because defensive tactics are weak (in effect, absent), this is
the minimally acheivable market inefficiency: the market naturally makes
84% of the available matches. Given the size of the corporate control mar-
ket, this result is consistent with our first prediction: the market naturally is
materially inefficient. We let the target capture 60% of expected match sur-
plus under the defensive-tactics-friendly legal regime. The market ineffi-
ciency then increases to 26%. This result is consistent with our second
prediction. In the simplified conditions the base case assumes, the market
makes 10% fewer matches under the defensive-tactics-friendly legal regime.
We next add realism to the simulated corporate control market. The
market now contains two types of acquirers—financial buyers and strategic
buyers. And the market contains three types of targets: materially improva-
ble firms (financial buyer targets), which do not search; passive potential
synergy targets; and searching potential synergy targets. There also are noise
firms. The more realistic simulations thus test for the joint importance of the
surplus split and the effect of demand side heterogeneity on the corporate
control market inefficiency.
Our second prediction, recall, is that the market inefficiency should be
materially greater in this realistic market than in the base case market. The
simulation results are consistent with the model’s prediction. The results are
set out in Tables 2 and 3. In the Tables, an AH agent is a financial buyer who
is searching for a materially improvable firm; an AS agent is a strategic
buyer who is searching for a synergy match; a TM agent is a passive synergy
target; a TA agent is an active, synergy target; a TP agent is a passive im-
provable target; and a P agent is a noise firm. Table 2 characterizes the
defensive-tactics-friendly legal regime; Table 3 characterizes the defensive-
tactics-unfriendly regime. Again, an acquirer searches over potential targets
until it either matches or exits the market because the next search would
yield negative utility.
60 The supporting Tables are in Appendix 2.
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TABLE 2
TABLE 3
In the defensive-tactics-friendly regime (the current Delaware regime),
financial buyers either make a match or exit after two searches; strategic
buyers either make a match or exit after four searches. The market makes 68
matches, yielding a s of .45 and a market inefficiency of 55%. In the defen-
sive-tactics-unfriendly regime, the financial buyers either make a match or
exit after four searches; the strategic buyers either make a match or exit after
making five searches. Because potential acquirers search more intensely in
the defensive-tactics-unfriendly regime, the market should make more
matches. The simulations generate approximately 91 matches, which yields
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a s of .60, and a market inefficiency of 40%. A move from the defensive-
tactics-friendly legal regime to the defensive-tactics-unfriendly regime thus
would reduce inefficiency in the market for corporate control by 15%.61
The more realistic simulations also suggest that it is particularly impor-
tant to encourage financial buyer search because it creates a positive exter-
nality. A deterred synergy match is only a welfare loss. A deterred financial
match also is a welfare loss, but the possibility that a financial buyer will
purchase a materially improvable target may increase the incentive of target
managers to protect their positions by improving their firms. In our simula-
tions, there is twice as much financial buyer search in the defensive-tactics-
unfriendly legal regime than in the Delaware Supreme Court’s current defen-
sive-tactics-friendly regime. Thus, returning to the earlier Chancery Court’s
defensive-tactics-unfriendly regime would do more than produce additional
matches; it also would increase the market’s ability to discipline shirking
managers.
Practitioners and academics sometimes argue that defensive tactics de-
ter an immaterial number of bids because there are many acquisitions each
year. To the contrary, our simulations suggest that the corporate control mar-
ket is much less exchange efficient under the defensive-tactics-friendly legal
regime. Today’s corporate control market makes almost $2 trillion of deals
per year. Our simulations show that moving to a defensive-tactics-unfriendly
legal regime would increase ex ante efficient acquisitions by a third. Thus, to
the extent that our simulations resemble the real world, strong defensive tac-
tics reduce deal value by over $150 billion a year.62
We conclude our exploration of the corporate control market ineffi-
ciency with some qualifications. These suggest that the actual inefficiency
could be either larger or smaller than the simulation results yield. Regarding
a smaller inefficiency, some deterred acquisitions could have turned out
61 Another way to view this result is that, if there are T total targets, moving to the defen-
sive-tactics-unfriendly regime would increase the number of made matches by a third: (.60 -
.45)T/.45T = .33. Our results concerning the relative intensity of search in the two regimes are
broadly consistent with two recent studies. One study of the antitakeover laws passed in the
last five decades found that a firm’s susceptibility to a hostile takeover peaked at 40% in 1973
(when modern defensive tactics had not yet been developed and no state antitakeover laws
existed), and fell to about 8.6% in 2014. See Cain et al., supra note 36, at 484. The second
study found that “deal hostility has fallen dramatically since the 1980s. While 34% of our
sample takeovers was hostile in the 1980s, this fraction falls to less than 10% in the latter two
periods.” Tingting Liu & J. Harold Mulherin, How has Takeover Competition Changed over
Time?, 49 J. CORP. FIN. 104, 112 (2018).
62 Comparing the possible inefficiency here to other search deterring market practices that
have recently been uncovered, a paper measured the loss from the lock-in effect that capital
gains taxes exert on M&A activity. The authors estimate an efficiency loss of $3.06 billion per
year for the United States. See Lars P. Feld et al., Taxing Away M&A: The Effect of Corporate
Capital Gains Taxes on Acquisition Activity 2 (ZEW, Discussion Paper No. 16-007, 2016).
Another paper estimated the welfare loss that price dispersion caused, due to inefficient con-
sumer search, in the credit card market. If every consumer purchased at the lowest market
price, welfare (exclusive of search costs) would improve by $36 billion per year. Victor Stango
& Jonathan Zinman, Borrowing High Versus Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shop-
ping Behavior in the U.S. Credit Card Market, 29 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 979, 981 (2015).
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badly. The welfare loss from unmade acquisitions should be adjusted to re-
flect the possibility that these transactions would not have improved per-
formance or achieved synergy. Further, though the data suggest that
acquisitions are ex ante efficient as a general matter, some acquisitions may
occur in service of acquirer management empire building. or because the
acquirer is paying for the acquisition with overvalued stock. Finally, our
simulations count an acquirer’s investigation of a matched firm as a wasted
search.63 This is unrealistic because, in life, already matched firms are easy
to distinguish from unmatched firms; public targets are required to disclose
when a match occurs so an acquirer can cheaply identify a matched firm.
Therefore, while in our simulations an acquirer may stop searching after,
say, three searches, if one of those searches hit on a matched firm, a real-
world acquirer may make a fourth search. Acquirers thus may search some-
what more than our simulation program permits, which would reduce the
corporate control market inefficiency.
On the other hand, our simulations also may understate acquisition mar-
ket inefficiency. Initially, we let the ratio of possible target matches to total
firms be unrealistically high. This made acquirer search more effective than
in fact it probably is. Further, the simulations suppose that lawyer and in-
vestment banker fees are invariant to the legal regime. These transaction
costs should be considerably higher when an acquirer has to overcome a
strong defensive tactics barrier rather than a weak barrier. If so, search costs
are higher in the defensive-tactics-friendly legal regime than the simulations
allow, which will reduce search. As a consequence, the simulated results
overstate the probability that acquirers make matches in that regime. Finally,
we assume that bargaining between acquirers and targets always results in a
value improving match. Bargaining between parties with asymmetric infor-
mation, however, sometimes fails, so that an acquirer who finds a good tar-
get may not succeed in buying it. The prospect of bargaining failure also
should reduce search.
Although these competing considerations are difficult to net out, there
is nonetheless a clear result. The simulation parameters are plausible, the
exchange inefficiency results accord with theoretically grounded predictions,
and those results are very large. Decision makers therefore should take as a
working assumption that the marginal contribution of defensive tactics to
corporate control market inefficiency is substantial.
63 Because we define a match as a completed deal, we do not permit an acquirer to make a
competing bid when its search uncovers a matched firm.
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V. RESULTS II: PRIVATE WELFARE
A. Defensive Tactics and Shareholder Welfare
The board of directors authorizes defensive tactics in response to man-
agement recommendations.64 In turn, courts set the level of allowable defen-
sive tactics while resolving litigation brought by shareholders or by the
acquirer with respect to a particular transaction.65 As Part I showed, the Del-
aware courts now give target boards great leeway in setting the level of
defensive tactics. There are two difficulties in assessing whether this board
discretion is desirable. The first is a measurement problem: how do different
defensive tactics levels affect shareholder welfare (recall that Delaware
courts do not consider social welfare). Comparing defensive tactics levels is
difficult, however, because they are “qualitative.” For example, is a poison
pill a stronger deterrent to hostile bids than a fair price law? It would be
helpful, in answering such questions, to have a method for converting defen-
sive tactics levels into the common metric of money: how various tactics
affect the target’s share of expected acquisition surplus.66 To date, no such
metric exists. Even after deriving a metric, the second difficulty is identify-
ing the defensive tactics level that maximizes expected target shareholder
welfare.
We begin with the measurement problem. Bargaining theory permits us
to develop a common metric by which the effect of different defensive tac-
tics levels can be assessed. Two factors affect bargaining power in a negotia-
tion: the bargainers’ disagreement points and their discount rates. Regarding
the first factor, the better a party’s alternative to bargaining failure, the better
the agent will do in the bargain: the counterparty will have to give up a
larger portion of the surplus to make the deal. Regarding the latter factor, the
64 Some defensive tactics, most importantly poison pills, can be authorized and deployed
by the board without shareholder approval. Other defensive tactics, such as a staggered board
or a barrier to a post-acquisition freeze-out of target shareholders, require a charter amend-
ment, and therefore shareholder approval after board initiation. Defensive tactics that require
shareholder approval are unnecessary because the ultimate defensive tactic is for shareholders
to reject insufficient bids. The adoption of a staggered board is an exception—shareholder
approval ties later shareholders’ hands. Eliminating a staggered board also requires a charter
amendment and so requires the board to initiate the process (or shareholders to launch a proxy
fight) before a charter amendment can be presented to the shareholders.
65 There are exceptions. The original Delaware Supreme Court decision that approved the
legality of the initial (and less toxic) version of a poison pill intended to discourage offers was
challenged by a Household director and large shareholder, who favored selling the company.
Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1349–50 (Del. 1985).
66 The empirical legal literature in particular focuses on the impact of defensive tactics
once an offer is made. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Sub-
ramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Pol-
icy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 885, 887 (2002) (measuring impact of the presence of a staggered board
on success rates for hostile tender offers). We are interested in the ex post effect of a defensive
tactic because that effect can be anticipated by a potential bidder and so affects its level of
search.
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lower a party’s discount rate relative to her counterparty, the greater that
party’s bargaining power. The high discount rate party is less patient: that is,
less able to wait for a better offer. A party seldom can affect her
counterparty’s disagreement point or her discount rate. A target, however,
can stretch the future out so that, even if a target and acquirer have the same
discount rate, the acquirer is functionally less patient.
A long future is unfriendly to an acquirer. Its payoff—its share of ex-
pected deal surplus—falls as the time between finding a possible target and
buying it increases. The acquirer may have to tie up resources for a longer
period, focus executive time on a deal for a longer period, pass up other
business opportunities, negotiate more intensively with the target, and con-
front a competitor for the acquisition opportunity. In addition, time permits
the target to continue a value-decreasing strategy or to delay implementing a
value-increasing strategy. This not only reduces target value, but also may
constrain the acquirer’s ability to increase value, depending on the type of
acquirer, by integrating the acquirer and target in a synergy-motivated acqui-
sition or by improving the target in a financially motivated acquisition.
Defensive tactics permit targets to extend the period between receiving
a bid and possibly concluding a deal. Different defensive tactics permit
targets to delay for different periods. A poison pill can delay an acquisition
for up to a year because it can take up to a year for the acquirer to win a
proxy contest and elect directors who will remove a pill.67 A poison pill with
a staggered board can delay an acquisition for over two years because the
acquirer must win two proxy contests, which in practice may block the offer.
Other defensive tactics also facilitate delay.
To summarize, the longer the period during which defensive tactics pre-
vent the acquirer who has identified a target from making an offer to target
shareholders, the less the acquirer’s bargaining power relative to the target.
As a result, there is a positive relationship between different tactics’ delay
facilitating properties and the share of acquisition surplus a tactic permits the
target to realize.68
The expected value of an acquisition to a target, however, also is a
function of bid probabilities—the likelihood that the target will receive a
bid. A firm can choose a defensive tactics level sufficiently high to preclude
bids altogether; that is, it can become a noise firm. A firm that does not
completely reject acquisitions will consider bid probabilities because these
affect the likelihood of an acquirer appearing. A faithful target board’s prob-
lem, then, is to solve for the defensive tactics level that optimally trades off
the probability of receiving a bid—which increases with weak defenses—
67 Heron & Lie, supra note 57, at 287, find that “poison pills induce greater final takeover
premiums, mostly as a result of bid increases after the initial bid.”
68 Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 844–45 (1981), provides an early statement of
this position.
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against the price conditional on a bid being made—which increases with
strong defenses.69
A target board thus should maximize a function such as
Maxd E(R) = p(s(1 - l(d))) - c(d)
where E(R) is the target’s expected return from a possible acquisition, d is
the target’s defensive tactics level, p is the probability an acquirer will bid,
(1 - l(d)) is the target’s expected share of the acquisition surplus,70 which is
s, and c(d) is the cost of implementing defenses.71 A target board that maxi-
mizes this revenue function will choose an “interior solution.” To enact no
defensive tactics would cause l(d) to approach one, which indicates that
most of the deal’s surplus would go to the acquirer. As a result, the expected
69 Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Do Takeover Defenses
Deter Takeovers?, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2359, 2365 (2017) is consistent with this analysis: “we
find that takeover likelihood is negatively and significantly related to both the G-Index and the
E-Index.” Lower scores on these indices correlate with higher defensive tactics levels. In a
later paper, these authors “find that 11 of the 24 G-index provisions are robustly and nega-
tively related to takeover likelihood.” The eleven provisions that negatively relate to takeover
likelihood are “anti-greenmail provisions, blank check preferred stock, classified boards, di-
rector contracts, director indemnification, director liability provisions, directors’ duties provi-
sions, executive severance contracts, fair price provisions, supermajority vote requirements,
and unequal voting rights.” Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert Schonlau & Eric Wehrly, Which
Antitakeover Provisions Matter? 1–2 (Mar. 14, 2018) (revised Apr. 12, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=314
2195. The authors find that poison pills do not differentially affect bid probability because
every firm in effect has a pill, but they do not consider that pills deter acquirer entry and so can
increase the market inefficiency. See also Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, CEO Preferences
and Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. 2813, 2815 (2015) (“the evidence suggests that managerial self-
interest causes the overall frequency of takeovers to be lower than optimal for target share-
holders”). Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Price and Probability: Decompos-
ing the Takeover Effects of Anti-Takeover Provisions, 75 J. Fin. 2591, 2593 (2020), show that a
shareholder vote to remove a takeover defense increases the probability of a takeover within
five years by about 4.1%. Similarly, a recent working paper found that antitakeover legislation
materially reduced the likelihood of becoming a takeover target. Marc Frattaroli, Does Protec-
tionist Anti-Takeover Legislation Lead to Managerial Entrenchment? 5 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Res.,
Working Paper No. 17-66, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3013077. Also, combining a
poison pill with a staggered board materially reduces the probability that a particular firm is
acquired. See, e.g., Duc Giang Nguyen, The Endogeneity of Poison Pill Adoption and Unsolic-
ited Takeovers 25 (Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Working Paper, 2015);
Tatyana Sokolyk, The Effects of Antitakeover Provisions on Acquisition Targets, 17 J. CORP.
FIN. 612, 613 (2011); Bates et al., supra note 58, at 660. Finally, reducing supermajority voting
requirements increases tender offers for Delaware targets. Audra Boone, Brian Broughman &
Antonio Macias, The Cost of Supermajority Target Shareholder Approval: Mergers Versus
Tender Offers 3 (Indian. Legal Stud., Res. Paper No. 331, 2015), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2629424. Many of the models that find negative correlations between corporate gov-
ernance indices and firm value, however, may suffer from serious endogeneity problems. A
recent study directly confronts this concern. Xin Chang & Hong Feng Zhang, Managerial
Entrenchment and Firm Value: A Dynamic Perspective, 50 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1083,
1101 (2015), argues that managerial entrenchment, which defensive tactics facilitate, materi-
ally reduces firm value.
70 Recall that ë is the acquirer’s surplus share.
71 The cost of choosing a defensive tactics level includes legal and investment banker fees
for advice as well as the cost, where applicable, of soliciting shareholder approval.
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revenue function approaches zero. A board that instead choses a very high
defensive tactics level would cause l(d) to approach zero, which indicates
that almost none of the deal’s surplus would go to the acquirer. This would
cause the bid probability p to approach zero as well, because potential buy-
ers would not search. The target’s revenue function would then become neg-
ative, because it would incur implementation costs but make no gains.
Intuitively, at one “corner,” the target would save the costs of enacting de-
fensive tactics but realize no revenue and, at the other “corner,” the target
would incur the costs of enacting defensive tactics but also realize no
revenue.
Unless a firm is willing to deter acquisitions altogether, the privately
optimal defensive tactics level therefore must permit a successful acquirer to
realize a material gain. Given that expectation, some potential acquirers will
search for targets to buy. On this reasoning, a target’s expected payoff must
increase as its defensive tactics level increases until the reduction in the bid
probability effect dominates the increase in the surplus share effect. Ex-
pressed mathematically, a target’s expected revenue function should be
strictly concave (that is, maximized at a single point).
The simulation results are consistent with our model’s third prediction.
We solved for the optimal acquirer search intensity—in other words, the
amount of acquirer search—under each of ten surplus splits for acquisition
gains, ranging from 0.1 of the surplus going to the target to all going to the
target. We then calculated a target’s expected return under each split, given
that acquirers were searching optimally against that split. Figure 1 summa-
rizes the results. In the Figure, the horizontal axis plots the target’s share of
the surplus, with increasing values for (1 - l(d)), and the vertical axis plots
the target’s payoff.
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FIGURE 1
The lowest curve, TM, is the return to passive synergy targets who will
match with a synergy acquirer. The second curve, TA, is the return to syn-
ergy targets that search for acquirers. This return is higher, despite the tar-
get’s search costs, because there is a greater probability of matching. The
third curve, TP, is the return to passive, materially improvable targets, which
do best because they match with financial acquirers but do not search them-
selves. The highest curve, T, sums the other three.72
The target’s revenue function is strictly concave, which implies that the
target allows the searching acquirer to realize some surplus.73 Further, the
return function is maximized at a target surplus share of approximately 0.6.
This, as Part IV showed, is inefficiently high.74
We make four remarks about the simulated private welfare result. Ini-
tially, the result supports our model and choice of parameters. The model
predicts that a curve describing target expected returns as a function of target
defensive tactics levels will be strictly concave, which is what the simula-
tions yield. Further, the curve has a left-hand skew. This result is consistent
with the sequential search strategy we specified for acquirers. That strategy
assumes convex search costs: later searches are more costly for acquirers
than earlier searches. Acquirer surplus shares, however, necessarily decrease
linearly: an acquirer share would be 0.5, say, under moderate defensive tac-
tics; 0.4 under stronger defensive tactics; 0.3 under still stronger defensive
tactics; and so on. Note that target expected returns fall as acquirer search
72 Appendix 3 contains the relevant tables from which Figure 1 is derived.
73 This is (a) of the model’s third prediction. See supra Part II. B.
74 This is (b) of the model’s third prediction. Id.
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intensity falls. Because an acquirer’s search intensity falls quadratically
when the acquirer’s expected surplus share falls linearly, the target’s return
should fall by a larger and larger amount with each increase in the target’s
share. For example, a target’s expected return should be greater when its
share increases from 0.3 to 0.4 of deal surplus than when its share increases
from 0.4 to 0.5. But then, the target’s expected return should decline more
rapidly as its surplus share exceeds the maximizing share—here, 0.6—than
the target’s expected return should increase as its share approaches the maxi-
mum. This is because the acquirer’s search costs are increasing at a higher
rate beyond the target’s optimal surplus share than before it. Visually, our
model predicts that a curve describing a target’s expected return as a function
of the defensive tactics level it choses will both be concave and skewed to
the left. That the curve we derive behaves this way supports our model and
choice of parameters.
Second, and substantively, the private welfare result we derive suggests
that target boards have been optimally trading off bid frequency against bid
size. To see why, recall that the market simulations set out in Part IV let
targets receive about 60% of the acquisition surplus under strong defensive
tactics. This share was derived from actual market data. In our simulation, a
faithful target board maximizes the target’s expected return when the target
receives about 60% of acquisition surplus. This result suggests that the 60%
share, which targets realize in real life, approximates the maximizing
share.75
Third, it is a live question whether courts have allowed boards to go too
far. The data we use to infer a 60% split in favor of targets ended in 2006.
Delaware courts now allow the poison pill-staggered board combination to
create a delay period of up to two years. Therefore, some potential targets’
currently chosen defensive tactics levels may yield surplus splits that exceed
the privately optimal division. This possibility is concerning if targets’ ex-
pected returns in the real world fall off as sharply when targets choose ex-
cessive defensive tactics levels as they do in the simulations.
Finally, the simulations show that private and social welfare conflict.
Target shareholder welfare in the simulations and, apparently, in the actual
market, is maximized when a target’s share of the acquisition surplus is
around 60%. But as Part IV shows, this share yields a suboptimal level of
matches. The large difference between individual and collective welfare re-
flects the search externality described above. Recall that because an individ-
ual target cannot influence the average defensive tactics level in the market,
faithful target boards should ignore the search dampening effect of their
choices. In equilibrium, every potential target thus chooses a defensive tac-
75 Liu & Mulherin, supra note 61, at 105 (arguing that because “takeover premiums have
not declined over time,” boards are choosing defensive tactics levels to increase their bargain-
ing power rather than to entrench themselves). This claim is consistent with our result: that
boards appear to have chosen privately optimal defensive tactics levels, at least over the period
for which we have data. See supra Part II. B.
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tics level that, when aggregated, yields a market average level that is higher
than the collectively efficient level. Because potential acquirers choose
search intensities with the market average in mind, boards that maximize
shareholder welfare are collectively reducing exchange efficiency in the cor-
porate control market.
B. The Delaware Courts: Reprise
Our simulation results also illuminate the disagreement between the
Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court over the accept-
able level of defensive tactics. The Supreme Court in Unocal initially devel-
oped a standard of review for defensive tactics that falls between the strict
“entire fairness” standard, which is applied to ordinary conflict-of-interest
transactions, and the lenient “business judgment” rule, which operates to
shield a board’s decision from judicial review when there is no conflict.76
This intermediate standard, which requires a defensive tactic be proportional
to the threat that the board perceived in the offer, was apt, because a board
can deploy defensive tactics either to increase target welfare by strengthen-
ing target bargaining power, or to reduce target welfare by entrenching the
directors and managers.
The Chancery Court then needed to decide how courts should apply the
novel intermediate review standard.77 Under the Chancery Court’s regime,
first announced in Interco, a faithful target board could deploy defensive
tactics, such as the poison pill, to buy time to seek higher bids or to explain
to its shareholders why the target’s market price understates the target’s real
value. After the needed time has passed, however, the shareholders should
be allowed to decide whether to accept an offer for the firm.78 That the share-
holders might accept an offer over the board’s objections was not a threat
that would warrant the board preventing the shareholders from determining
the offer’s outcome.79
Two years after Interco, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the
Chancery Court’s approach. Reading that approach as the Chancery Court
“substituting its judgement for what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corpora-
tion’s board of directors,” the Supreme Court held in Time-Warner: “[t]o
the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so . . . we hereby
76 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
77 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 8, at 252 (setting out the issues that remained open for
Chancery Court resolution following the Supreme Court’s decision in Unocal).
78 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797–98 (Del. Ch. 1988).
79 “To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation of ‘poison pills’ to
deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive offer, after the
board has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create alternatives, or to attempt to nego-
tiate on the shareholders’ behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared
notions of appropriate corporate governance as to threaten the legitimacy and authority of our
corporation law.” Id. at 799–800.
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reject such an approach.”80 The Supreme Court next extended Time-Warner
in Unitrin to allow a board to maintain its poison pill, unless the pill would
make a successful proxy fight to replace directors in favor of candidates who
would redeem the pill “mathematically impossible or realistically unattaina-
ble.”81 As a result, a target board can delay a bid for as long as two election
cycles.
Our results provide the first rigorous support for the Chancery Court’s
solution. In the simulations, defensive tactics increase target shareholder
welfare at the outset but later reduce it. They permit an extended delay that
reaches the point where the effect of a reduced number of bids outweighs the
effect of an increased target share. Therefore, if private welfare is the rele-
vant measure, time-limiting defensive tactics are a good strategy. The Chan-
cery Court’s informal analysis and our simulations thus point generally in the
same direction: giving the target board too much discretion over delaying a
hostile tender offer reduces social welfare, and can also reduce target share-
holder welfare.
C. The Investment Efficiency Defense of Defensive Tactics
Recently, scholars have developed two versions of an investment effi-
ciency justification for defensive tactics: the myopic-market response and
the customer-and-supplier rationale. The first version supposes that the capi-
tal market is myopic; that is, a firm’s market price will not fully reflect the
return from a project that takes a long time to mature.82 When the target’s
share price is inefficiently low, its shareholders may accept a bid that is
materially above that price but also materially below the company’s real
value. Directors and managers may respond to this possibility by rejecting
firm-specific human capital investments that could create value for the com-
80 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (Time-Warner), 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
(1989).The Court went on to justify this result in part by the concern that “Time shareholders
might elect to tender into Paramount’s cash offer in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the
strategic benefit which a business combination . . . might produce.” Id. For an analysis of the
difficulty of assuming shareholder ignorance as a justification for blocking shareholders’ abil-
ity to choose to accept a tender offer in the face of the fact that 70% of the shareholders of
large U.S. public corporations are institutional investors. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 10,
at 865.
81 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389 (Del. 1995). See Ronald J. Gil-
son, Unocal 15 Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 502
(2001) (highlighting the Delaware Supreme Court’s unexplained preference for control
changes through elections rather than takeovers); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Sales
and Elections as Methods for Transferring Corporate Control, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 783,
784 (2001) (same).
82 The empirical claim that the stock market is myopic, on which this argument is based, is
contested. Roe surveys the empirical and legal literature concerning short-termism. See, e.g.,
Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS.
LAW. 977, 978–79 (2013) (summarizing the literature); Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-
Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 73–77 (2018).
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pany in the long term.83 To be sure, managers are partially compensated with
stock, but stock is an inadequate response if the future value of the manag-
ers’ investments is not fully reflected in the target’s current price. Target
shareholders are said to recognize that their firm’s controllers may manage
for the short term. They attempt to preclude this possibility by authorizing
strong defensive tactics. These tactics, therefore, represent the shareholders’
commitment to the managers that they will not sell the target prematurely.84
There are two difficulties with the myopic-market efficiency justifica-
tion for defensive tactics. First, it assumes that shareholders authorize all
defensive tactics. However, shareholders do not have to approve the adop-
tion of a poison pill. They also do not have to approve combining the poison
pill with a preexisting staggered board which shareholders had approved
before the era of hostile takeovers. Boards can unilaterally adopt these de-
fensive tactics and use them, either to increase value or to entrench
themselves.
Further, deciding which efficiency concept deserves more weight in the
market for corporate control raises an empirical question. Scholars have re-
cently approached this empirical question by analyzing the effect of stag-
gered boards—the strongest defensive tactic—on firm value. In our view,
while the investment efficiency defense of staggered boards remains theoret-
ically plausible, the evidence to date remains mixed at best.85 The exchange
83 This argument first appeared in Stein, supra note 9, at 71; see also JOHN KAY, THE KAY
REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING, 9–11, 14, 16–20
(2012).
84 This argument resurrects the Delaware Supreme Court’s concern in Time-Warner—that
sophisticated shareholders might tender erroneously—now because the shareholders lack in-
formation that the board and management have, but somehow cannot credibly convey to the
shareholders. See Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1153.
85 Cremers, Sepe, and coauthors have written several papers claiming that staggered
boards increase firm value. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe,
Staggered Boards and Long-Term Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 422–24, 425,
427–28 (2017); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empow-
ered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70–75, 100–08 (2016); K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Mas-
conale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730–35, 749–53, 755–76 (2016). Their empirical analysis is contested.
On the theoretical level, if staggered boards do increase value, then the shareholders of destag-
gering firms have voted for a value-reducing governance change, which seems implausible,
especially given the intermediation of equity and, in particular, the rise of index-holding by
institutions. A recent paper made this point, corrected for what its authors believe are spurious
correlations in the data of the earlier papers, and argued that destaggering boards does not
reduce firm value. See Emiliano M. Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and
Firm Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value? 38–39 (NYU
L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17–39, 2017), https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2994559. A more recent paper corrected for other empirical defects in the Cremers et
al. papers and showed that any value-increasing effect was not statistically significant. See
Yakov Amihud et al., Settling the Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475,
1476–80, 1487, 1491, 1507–08 (2018).
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efficiency objection to defensive tactics should thus be given more weight
than the myopic market investment efficiency response.86
The second version of the investment efficiency rationale holds that the
prospect of a hostile takeover may discourage a firm’s customers and suppli-
ers from making relationship-specific investments in the firm. An acquirer,
who has no particular loyalty to these stakeholders, may exploit the sunk
cost aspect of such investments by renegotiating the target’s deals.87 Antici-
pating such behavior, the stakeholders would be unwilling to make invest-
ments that generate higher returns for the target firm than for other firms. In
this version of the investment efficiency justification, defensive tactics allow
the firm’s managers to reassure customers and suppliers by making a credi-
ble commitment that the firm has protected them from a potential acquirer’s
strategic behavior.
There are theoretical concerns with the customer-and-supplier version
of the investment efficiency justification. A supplier can protect itself with a
long-term contract because such contracts can bind a future acquirer. A con-
tract seems more secure than an implicit reputational sanction. To be sure,
some contracts between companies and their customers and suppliers are
implicit; it is sometimes too costly to form explicit contracts about possibly
significant future actions. Nevertheless, the relationship specific theory is
incomplete: if implicit contracts are sufficiently attractive to existing man-
agement to make voluntary compliance in the target’s interest—both to facil-
itate deals and to create a good reputation—then the implicit contracts
should be equally attractive to an acquirer. The converse would follow as
well. Thus, proponents of the relationship specific customer-and-supplier
justification need to explain why a strategy that is maximizing for the target
when independent is not also maximizing for the target as part of the
acquirer.
86 Contracting may also ameliorate the investment inefficiency concern. A firm’s execu-
tives often have golden parachutes and compensation packages with a significant variable
component. In the event of a successful hostile bid, an executive would receive a large pay-
ment from her golden parachute and, if the historical average regarding surplus splits holds, a
large payoff from her stock. Sepe and Whitehead show that golden parachutes create incen-
tives for managers to invest in innovation by compensating them if they are dismissed before
the innovation bears fruit. See Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes:
Incentives, Investment and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2032–37, 2042–49 (2015). Fich
et al. also show that golden parachutes materially increase deal completion probabilities, create
large gains for target CEOs, and may benefit target shareholders. Eliezer M. Fich et al., On the
Importance of Golden Parachutes, 48 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1717, 1718–21 (2013).
And, more recently, Karpoff et al. found that “[t]wo provisions are positively related to take-
over likelihood – golden parachutes and restrictions on action by written consent.” Karpoff et
al., supra note 70, at 2.
87 See William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover Defenses: Evidence
from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 310 (2015). This position was introduced in Andrei
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 34, 41–42 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Strong defensive tactics give a target’s board substantial discretion to
decide whether to accept an offer to buy the company; weak defensive tac-
tics permit the target’s shareholders to decide even when the target’s board
disfavors the offer. Delaware law permits public firms to adopt strong defen-
sive tactics, and most firms have done so. There are four justifications for
Delaware Law. First, markets may underprice public companies, so that
shareholders may mistakenly tender to bids below a target’s true value. As a
result, target assets sometimes move from higher- to lower-valuing ac-
quirers, which is exchange inefficient. Board control can prevent such ineffi-
cient takeovers. Second, boards with control can negotiate for higher prices
than atomized shareholders could realize on their own. Third, unregulated
defensive tactics may be investment inefficient. Markets may underprice
growth, allowing acquirers to expropriate target projects with long-term
payoffs. Anticipating this, targets would eschew such projects, leading to
investment inefficiency. Board control prevents this result. Fourth, empow-
ered boards can better protect stakeholders from acquisition-caused losses.
This article extensively considers the first two justifications and re-
views the case for the third. Regarding the first, we assume, along with most
academic commentators, that capital market prices do not routinely skew
low. Therefore, defensive tactics are unnecessary to achieve exchange effi-
ciency. Indeed, these tactics are exchange inefficient because they permit
targets to acquire a large share of the expected surplus from an acquisition
and therefore reduce the acquirers’ returns from finding and buying good
targets. While this theoretical result has been in the literature for a long
time,88 the policy issue is in magnitudes: in the market, does corporate con-
trol create exchange efficiency of the first or second order? This is an empir-
ical question, but conventional empirical techniques cannot yield an answer.
This largely is because the researcher cannot run this real world experiment:
how the same market with the same agents performs under weak and strong
defensive tactics levels. Also, we argue, market-wide, cross-sectional, and
time series studies have been too difficult for empiricists to do in the market
for corporate control.
Turning to private welfare, a target board should trade off the bid-re-
duction effect of strong defensive tactics against their surplus-maximizing
effect, conditional on bids occurring. The empirical researcher, however,
cannot observe whether actual boards are making this trade-off efficiently or
choosing entrenching levels of defensive tactics. Importantly, this is because
the researcher cannot observe unmade bids; that is, the bids that particular
targets’ defensive tactics levels have deterred.
88 See Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
229, 238–39 (1986).
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We attempt to answer the exchange efficiency and private welfare ques-
tions by developing an informal structural model of the corporate control
market. In this model, potential acquirers search sequentially for potential
targets to buy, taking into account targets’ chosen levels of defensive tactics;
and targets choose defensive tactics levels, taking into account acquirers’
search strategies. The model supports three theoretically grounded predic-
tions. First, the corporate control market inefficiency89 is substantial, defen-
sive tactics aside, largely because search is particularly costly in the
corporate control market and because potential acquirers must share ex-
pected acquisition surplus with targets. Because the acquirer must split the
surplus with the target, the acquirer equates its partial share of the marginal
return from search to its private marginal cost, thus searching too infre-
quently from an exchange efficiency viewpoint. Second, the marginal contri-
bution of strong defensive tactics to market inefficiency is large because
strong defensive tactics both take additional surplus from acquirers and
make search less productive. Third, faithful target boards will choose defen-
sive tactics levels that are privately efficient but socially excessive, because
the boards do not take into account the search-dampening effect of their
individual choices on the corporate control market as a whole.
Simulations permit us to test these theoretical predictions by running
the natural experiment and observing how the same corporate control market
performs under the two defensive tactics legal regimes: (1) a defensive-tac-
tics-unfriendly regime that constrains defensive tactics and (2) a defensive-
tactics-friendly regime, roughly like the current Delaware Supreme Court’s
position, which gives target boards significant discretion to choose their
level. Our results are consistent with the model’s predictions: the corporate
control market inefficiency is substantial even when defensive tactics are
weak; the marginal contribution of defensive tactics to the market ineffi-
ciency is high; and faithful boards do choose socially excessive defensive
tactics levels.
It is important to highlight the second exchange inefficiency result. The
simulated market makes 15% fewer acquisitions under strong defensive tac-
tics levels than under weak defensive tactics levels. The resulting efficiency
loss, if real, would be very large, because the U.S. corporate control market
today concludes close to $2 trillion a year of deals.
We do not argue that these results, standing alone, justify major legal
change. The parameters we use—such as the ratio of financial to synergy
targets—are derived from real world data, but are not directly observed.
Also, simulations are not reality. Rather, our goal is to revive the debate
89 We define the “market inefficiency” as one minus the ratio of made matches to total
available matches during a period in which the corporate control market functions. For exam-
ple, if searching acquirers and targets made sixty of a possible hundred matches, the market
inefficiency would be 40%. The “marginal contribution” of defensive tactics to the market
inefficiency is the difference between the market inefficiency when defensive tactics are strong
and when they are weak.
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about the desirability of defensive tactics. We do claim that our parameter
values are plausible, and that our model is intuitive and theoretically
grounded. In turn, the sizable magnitude of our results—over a $100 billion
of foregone deals a year—strongly suggests that we should seriously rethink
current Delaware law.
As for private welfare, our simulations suggest that despite legal rules
that are sub-optimally restrictive, and contrary to the views of many academ-
ics, target boards have been relatively faithful fiduciaries for their sharehold-
ers. We note, however, that corporate culture is dynamic, as powerfully
evidenced by the Business Roundtable’s recent (and perhaps largely rhetori-
cal) statement that a board’s obligations run first to stakeholders and then to
shareholders.90 Though this result also suggests that we should rethink sim-
ple agency theory explanations for a board’s choice of defensive tactics, we
stress that whether boards are optimizing private welfare is quite different
from whether the corporate control market is performing efficiently. Finally,
we argue briefly that the evidence does not support the investment efficiency
justification for strong defensive tactics. We leave the stakeholder question
for another day.91
Our results have substantive and methodological implications. Substan-
tively, the results suggest that current legal rules allow defensive tactics
levels that are privately as well as socially inefficient. Interestingly, they also
shed light on a lengthy methodological debate, over precisely this issue, be-
tween the Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Chancery Court. On
this one, the Chancery Court has the better of the argument.
90 See Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of the Corporation to Promote ‘An
Economy That Serves all Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://
www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-
promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
91 Gilson, supra note 12, frames the issue.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1. MATCHING PROBLEM MODEL-CODE DESCRIPTION
All acquisition market models were simulated in MATLAB, a software
program designed for the manipulation of matrices. MATLAB allows a user
to write code to generate and simulate an agent-based model under various
parameters. A simulation run of the market model begins by specifying a
population size (in our case, 1,100 total risk neutral agent-firms) with agent-
firms of one of six specified types. There are 425 total acquiring (A) agent-
firms in the simulated population. These firms are actively seeking to match
with a target firm. Of these 425 A agent-firms, 295 are synergy (AS) type
acquiring firms, and 130 are private equity (AH) type acquiring firms. AS
type acquiring firms are actively seeking to match with those target firms
with whom they may form a synergistic collaboration, for example, an auto
manufacturer seeking to match with a tire manufacturer.
Synergy target firms with whom AS type firms seek to match may be
either themselves actively seeking to match with AS type firms (TA type
target agent-firms), or they may be passive synergy targets who are willing
to match with AS type firms, if approached (TM type target agent-firms).
There are four TA type active, synergy target agent-firms, and ninety-six TM
type passive, synergy target agent-firms. AS type acquiring firms only seek
to match with either TA or TM type target firms. There are fifty materially
improvable firms. AH type acquiring firms are actively seeking to match
with these passive target (TP) firms. There are 525 TP type passive, noise
firms.
The simulations begin by randomly populating the 775 total agent-
firms. Starting with TA type firms, the code randomly selects an index (that
is, a location within the population matrix). If the indexed location within
the population matrix is already occupied, the code selects again until an
unoccupied indexed location has been selected. Then, the code populates
that indexed location with one of the TA agents. This process repeats until all
of the TA agents are in indexed locations within the population matrix. This
process repeats for all six of the different agent-firm traits and types until the
entire population matrix is populated. The order in which the six different
agent-firm traits and types are placed within the population matrix is TA, TP,
TM, P, AS, and then AH.
After the agent-firms are populated, the searching process begins. All
of the searching agent-firms search over the same target universe. We let
acquirers and actively searching synergy target (TA) agent-firms make up to
twenty searches.92 There are 1,000 simulation runs of each total search. A
total search is defined as the point at which each acquiring agent-firm and
92 Restricting searches to twenty is without loss of generality because, in the simulations,
it is never optimal for an acquirer to take more than ten draws.
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each actively searching synergy target (TA) agent-firm has had an opportu-
nity to complete a search of a specified number of agent-firms (this is their
“search intensity”). First, all of the searching agent-firms search a single
agent-firm, then two agent-firms, then three, and so on, until completing a
total search, which is defined as the point at which all of the searching agent-
firms have had an opportunity to complete a search of twenty-two agent-
firms. Thus, the population matrix is repopulated 1,000 times for each total
search.
For each simulation run at each search intensity, every searching agent-
firm (that is, the AS, AH, and TA agent-firms) in the population matrix can
search for its desired match (AS firms search for TA and TM firms, AH firms
search for TP firms, and TA firms search for AS firms). If a searcher has
matched when its opportunity to search comes around, it does not search.
Search is terminated in two ways: a searching agent-firm is matched because
it found a desired match or has been found by a desired match, or the next
search would generate negative utility for the acquiring agent-firm. Illustrat-
ing the latter possibility, let a potential acquirer realize positive expected
utility at its third search, but the acquirer would realize negative expected
utility from a fourth search. Then the model has this acquirer either matching
in one of its first three searches, or exiting after fruitlessly searching three
possible targets. It is the expected utility of the acquiring agent-firms (the AS
and AH agent-firms) that dictates whether search occurs and what an agent’s
search intensity is.
To be clear, we determine the point at which the acquiring agent-firms
cease searching by having all of the searching agent-firms conduct a total
search at each level of search intensity (over one agent-firm, over two agent-
firms, . . . , over twenty agent-firms) for 1,000 simulation runs. If the ex-
pected utility for an acquiring agent-firm is positive when it searches over
three agent-firms, but negative when it searches over four agent-firms, then
this acquiring agent-firm stops searching after it has searched over three
agent-firms.
When a match occurs, only the searching agent incurs search costs. This
is so when the found agent is itself a searching type. Also, the agent-firm
being searched, even when the search fails to result in a match, does not
incur search costs. Only searching agents incur search costs.
A simulation run unfolds as follows: The code iterates through the en-
tire population matrix of 775 agent-firms, one by one. First, it checks to
ensure that the current population member is not already matched with a
partner firm. In addition to the population matrix, which is called pop, there
is a matching matrix, called popMatch. The population matrix, pop, has a
single column, but the matching matrix, popMatch, has two columns. The
rows of the first column of the popMatch (matching) matrix are initially
populated with zeros (at the beginning of each new simulation run). As
agent-firms are matched with one another, these rows in the first column of
the popMatch matrix are filled with ones to indicate that the agent-firms in
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the corresponding indexed locations (rows) in the population matrix, pop,
have been matched with partner firms. Thus, the first column of the match-
ing matrix, popMatch, is populated entirely by ones and zeros. The code
finds whether an agent-firm has been matched or not, by checking the agent-
firm’s index in the pop matrix within the first column of the popMatch ma-
trix; there has been a match if the indexed location (row) in the first column
of the popMatch matrix is a one, but not if it is a zero. Throughout the search
process, the code repeatedly checks to see if the current population member
(agent-firm) has been matched or not. This ensures that an agent-firm ceases
searching upon having achieved a match, and ceases incurring search costs
as well. The second column of the popMatch matrix holds the indexed loca-
tion (row) in the pop matrix of the agent-firm with whom the current popula-
tion member is matched, if there is a match. Therefore, we know not only
whether an agent-firm is matched, but with whom the firm is matched.
Once the code has checked that the current population member is not
matched with an agent-firm, the code checks whether the current population
member is a searching agent-firm. To see how the simulations then proceed,
suppose that the current population member is an AS—that is, an acquiring
synergy searching—firm. The code searches for a match for this firm. To
begin a search over one, two, . . ., twenty agent-firms, the code randomly
selects an initial agent-firm within the population matrix, pop, as its starting
point. The code next checks to make sure that this initial agent-firm is not
the current population member engaging in a search. The code then starts
searching, iterating through the entire universe, one by one, looking for de-
sired matches for the searching population member. If the current searcher is
an AS type, the code looks for either TA or TM type firms with whom the AS
type may match. If, however, the AS firm searches a TP or P type, then the
AS firm incurs search costs in consequence of these searches, but it will not
match with any of the searched firms. The searching AS population member
will also incur search costs for searching any TA and TM firms that have
been matched. Searching acquirers (AS and AH type agent-firms) do not in-
cur search costs when they meet other searching acquirers, however. Search-
ing, active, synergy target (TA) type agent-firms also do not incur search
costs when they meet passive, materially improvable target (TP) agent-firms.
The payoffs from matches, and the costs from searches, are recorded for
each population member in a matrix called popFitness. The popFitness ma-
trix is a single column, and the indexed location in the popFitness matrix
holds the total net payoff of the agent-firm population member in the corre-
sponding indexed location in the pop matrix. The popFitness matrix is ini-
tialized as a column of zeros at the beginning of each new simulation run.
As an example, suppose that the code is searching a TP type firm on
behalf of the AS searcher, and the other firm is the first firm to be searched.
Upon recognizing the type of current firm being searched, the code immedi-
ately checks whether the current, searching AS firm is already matched. This
occurs before instance of the code imposing costs or awarding payoffs to
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current, searching population members. This is so, because the current popu-
lation member ceases to search and ceases to incur search costs immediately
upon having achieved a desired match. Once the code has determined that
the current, searching population member has not been matched, the code
imposes search costs upon the AS type for having searched a firm with
whom the current, searching population member did not match.
Turning to how the code calculates search costs, the cost for searching a
sample of a single agent is -2 utils. We chose this value because search costs,
we assume, are 2% of the match surplus, which is set at 100 utils. The code
is instructed that search costs are quadratic; they vary according to the num-
ber of draws (number of agent-firms searched) as follows: Search costs = -2
- (draw number/10)2 + .25.
Thus, the search cost for searching one agent-firm is -2 utils; the search
cost imposed for searching a second agent is -2.75 utils, and so on. Search
becomes costlier as the search continues. The indexed location of the cur-
rent, searching population member in the pop matrix is altered in the popFit-
ness matrix, so that the current total net payoff of the current, searching
population member reflects these search costs for having searched and failed
to match with a TP type firm. The line of code appears as follows: popFit-
ness(i) = popFitness(i) + cc; where cc is the variable for search costs for the
possible number of agent-firms searched. Remember that the popFitness ma-
trix is initialized as a column of zeros at the beginning of each simulation
run. If the current AS type had met and searched a P type agent-firm, the
code uses the same process for imposing costs. This also is the case if the
current AS type had met and searched either a TA or a TM type that had
already been matched with a different AS type firm.
The code next turns to the next agent-firm that the AS firm will search.
Suppose that this second agent firm to be searched is an unmatched TA type.
The code checks whether this agent is matched by checking the indexed
location (row) in the first column of the popMatch matrix that corresponds
to the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of the TA firm being
searched. If the code determines that the TA type is unmatched, the code
checks again to make sure that the searching AS type is unmatched. If
neither firm is matched, the code makes a match, records it, charges search
costs to the searching firm, and allocates payoffs between the agents. In
particular, the code first alters the indexed location (row) of the popFitness
matrix that corresponds to the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of
the current, searching AS type population member. The popFitness matrix is
altered as follows: popFitness(i) = popFitness(i) + B + cc, where B is the
payoff that an AS type firm receives for matching with a TA type firm.
To see how B is calculated, suppose that the surplus generated by a
successful match is split equally between the A (acquiring) type agent-firm
and the T (target) type agent-firm. (Various splits of the surplus are possible.
The code calculates asymmetric splits, that favor either A or T agents, to
approximate the markets that result from legal regimes that are either
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 49 12-MAR-21 14:04
2021] An Efficiency Analysis of Defensive Tactics 49
friendly or unfriendly to defensive tactics). Because we approximate the cost
of searching a single agent at 2% of the surplus generated by a successful
match, and we set the search cost of searching a sample of a single agent at 2
utils, B is equal to 100*(1/2). This is the payoff that an AS type agent-firm
receives for successfully matching with a TA type agent-firm. The TA type
agent-firm that is searched (the second of two agent-firms being searched)
receives a payoff for having achieved a desired match (by being found, but
not by having found a match), but incurs no search costs. The popFitness
matrix is altered as follows: popFitness(jj) = popFitness(jj) + E, where E is
the payoff that a TA type firm receives for successfully matching with an AS
type firm; and jj is the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of the TA
type firm that is being searched. Because the surplus generated by a success-
ful match, in this example, is split equally between the A (acquiring) agent-
firm and the T (target) agent-firm, E also equals 100 utils*(1/2). The TA
agent-firm being searched incurs no search costs.
Having allotted payoffs to both firms that are now successfully matched
with one another, as well as costs for having searched, the code now records
that each is now matched, and also records who is matched with whom.
First, the code places a “1” in the indexed location (row) in the first column
of the popMatch matrix that corresponds to the indexed location (row) in the
pop matrix of the current, searching AS type firm. Then, the code places a
“1” in the indexed location (row) in the first column of the popMatch matrix
that corresponds to the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of the cur-
rent TA type firm being searched. The second column of the popMatch ma-
trix is reserved for recording the identities of the partners with whom the
agent-firms are matched. An agent-firm’s identity is its indexed location
(row) in the pop matrix. For example, the current, searching AS type firm’s
second column of its indexed location (row) in the popMatch matrix is popu-
lated with the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of the current TA
type firm being searched. Similarly, the current TA type firm’s second col-
umn of its indexed location (row) in the popMatch matrix is populated with
the indexed location (row) in the pop matrix of the current, searching AS
type firm. These lines of code appear as follows:
popFitness(i) = popFitness(i) + B + cc;





In the example discussed above, a successful match was made, but
agents may fail to match. Even so, each agent-firm member within the two-
draw search intensity of the example has been searched as a potential match.
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Because the AS firm has exhausted its search, the code moves on to the next
agent-firm in the pop matrix.
When all of the searching agent-firms in the population have either had
a chance to search for a desired match or have been successfully matched by
having been found, the simulation run is nearly over. It remains to record
how well or poorly each agent type fared over each simulation run, and,
subsequently, over the 1,000 simulation runs for each relevant search inten-
sity. For each simulation run, the code records (for each agent-firm type) the
number of matched agents, the total payoff of the matched agents, the total
payoff for all agent-firms of that type, and the total payoff of the unmatched
agents, as well as the number of agents of that type. Subsequently, the code
records the averages of each of these values over the 1,000 simulation runs
for each search intensity level.
The code also records, for each simulation run, the expected utility of
each agent type, as well as the probability of matching, for each agent type.
The expected utility is calculated as the total payoff of matched agents (of
whichever type) plus the total payoff of unmatched agents (of whichever
type), the sum of which is divided by the number of agents of that type. The
probability of matching for a particular agent type is the number of actual
matched agents (of whichever type) divided by the number of agents of that
type. Subsequently, the code records the averages of each of these values
over the 1,000 simulation runs for each sample size (search intensity level).
These total payoffs, probabilities of matching, and expected utilities for the
various agent-firm types are then manipulated in an Excel spreadsheet to
determine which markets (identified by various parameters) are more or less
matched efficiently.
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APPENDIX 2.
TABLE 4
Here, we simulate only acquirers—the A row—and targets—the T row.
The zero rows reflect market agents we do not simulate, such as financial
buyers.
TABLE 5
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\11-1\HLB104.txt unknown Seq: 52 12-MAR-21 14:04
52 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 11
APPENDIX 3.
In the order the tables are set out, the target realizes .4, .5, .6 and .7 of
the surplus. The target’s expected return is maximized at the .6 split, and the
positive difference between the .5 and .6 splits is smaller than the negative
difference between the .6 and.7 splits. Figure 1 in Part V. A. is represented
continuously because it connects all of the splits. This is why a target’s maxi-
mum expected return is set at approximately a 60% share.
TABLE 6
TABLE 7
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TABLE 8
TABLE 9
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APPENDIX 4. ACQUISITION TYPES
TABLE 10: U.S. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACQUIRERS
(SOURCE: FACTSET)
Year  Total Acquisitions of  






2016 293 182 37 62.11% 
2015 310 209 35 67.41% 
2014 261 188 27 72.03% 
2013 236 160 40 67.9% 
2012 261 172 46 65.90% 
